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 Abstract 
This dissertation examines the impact of family characteristics on workers’ 
reactions to compensation incentives. Workers’ reactions to incentives refer to workers’ 
job choices based on incentives and workers’ effort supply in the job with incentives. 
Developing a theoretical model that extends the standard model of effort, this dissertation 
explicitly incorporates family characteristics (i.e., the employment status of spouse, child 
characteristics such as the number of children and the age of child, and the presence of 
alternative family income sources) into a worker’s effort supply function. The key 
theoretical linkages in the model involve income targets, loss aversion, and time and 
energy constraints. The model predicts that these family characteristics would have 
impacts on workers’ effort through three theoretical channels. The model also implies 
that workers associated with different family characteristics would sort themselves into 
different jobs based on the presence of incentive pay. 
The reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and reactions to 
incentives are analyzed using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and 
the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). The results show that workers with different 
family characteristics, such as the number of children, sort themselves into different jobs 
based on the presence of incentive pay in the job. Moreover, the results weakly support 
the importance of family characteristics on workers’ effort supply as measured by the 
amount of incentive pay the worker received in their job. Furthermore, using detailed 
time use variables from the ATUS reveals the role of an underlying mechanism—time 
constraints on work—by which the relationships occur. By shedding light on a previously 
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unexplored role that family characteristics play, this dissertation adds a novel perspective 
to heterogeneous responses to compensation incentives by workers.  
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Chapter 1  Introduction 
Many important empirical phenomena on how different family characteristics 
such as marital status and child characteristics might influence workers’ job performance 
have drawn people’s attention for a long time. For example, there has been a comparison 
of job performances and career outcomes between single workers and their married co-
workers in the workplaces. Some articles in the popular press point out single women 
might be working harder than their married co-workers because single women could take 
more work or work overtime, while not needing time-off for family needs.
1
 In addition, 
some studies show that there is a wage gap between married men and single men: 
married men appear to earn 10 to 20 percent more than single men doing the same job 
(Korenman & Neumark 1991; Ginther & Zavodny 2001). One possible reason is that 
marriage increases married men’s productivity so that married men could work harder 
and earn more per hour. Another example is related to the debate about whether having a 
child will influence a worker’s performance or not. Some research does find that mothers 
reported reduced self-reported work effort if having preschool-age children (Bielby & 
Bielby 1988); while some research does not find significant evidence: there are no 
differences between mothers and non-parents on self-reported work effort (Kmec 2011). 
Moreover, being parents would influence workers’ time allocations among work and 
                                                 
1
  The articles include social media reports such as the article by Hillary Crosley  (the link 
is 
http://www.theroot.com/articles/culture/2013/06/are_single_women_working_harder_tha
n_married_coworkers.html) and the article by SBrinkmann (the link is 
http://www.womenofgrace.com/blog/?p=23189), in which the “Generation Juggle” 
survey conducted by Red Magazine is discussed. 
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other non-work activities. According to the analysis in a Pew Research Center report 
(Wang, 2013), parents find spending time on caring for children to be much more 
meaningful and also exhausting than spending time at work. Thus, to sum up, these 
aforementioned phenomena show that workers with different family characteristics could 
have different performance levels at work, but these phenomena are not in the context of 
incentives.  
Moreover, motivating employees through an appropriate incentive is the core 
problem in the personnel economics. Previous empirical studies focus on how strongly 
workers react to different incentive schemes, including piece rates (Lazear 2000; Shearer 
2004; Freeman & Kleiner 2005), tournaments (Ehrenberg & Bognanno 1990), and other 
forms of incentives such as bonuses, efficiency wages, and team incentives (Prendergast 
1999; Bandiera et al. 2007). On this basis, employers can design different types of reward 
programs to motivate workers. In the literature, workers’ reactions to incentives usually 
refer to how much effort they put into work. In addition, workers also react to incentives 
by making job choices based on whether they receive incentive pay in the job. These are 
the two types of workers’ reactions to compensation incentives studied in this 
dissertation.  
In the standard model of effort supply, the worker chooses the level of effort that 
maximizes their utility function after observing the compensation scheme. At the same 
time, the worker will decide whether to participate in exerting effort by comparing the 
offered incentive with the outside options. Thus, as long as the participation constraint is 
satisfied, the optimal effort level will be achieved when the marginal benefit equals the 
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marginal cost of effort. However, there are several limitations of the standard approach to 
modeling effort supply. One limitation is that the determination of the marginal utility of 
income and the marginal cost of effort is taken as given in the standard model. This 
ignores other factors that might influence the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of 
effort. Also, the determinants of the worker’s time and energy, which is presumably 
critical when the worker decides how hard to work, are not explicitly modeled. Moreover, 
the standard model doesn’t recognize that workers should make job choices based on 
whether they receive incentive pay in the job. But if differences across workers affect the 
attractiveness of different incentive plans, then workers should sort themselves into jobs 
with different attributes, such as working environments, worker skills and other job 
requirements, based on the theory of equalizing differences (Brown 1980; Rosen 1986).  
Therefore, it is essential to further understand whether workers react differently 
when they face the same incentives and what factors influence workers’ heterogeneous 
reactions to compensation incentives. It is an important question but there is limited 
existing research on this topic. The purpose of this dissertation is to explore some 
potential factors in determining workers’ reactions to compensation incentives and the 
underlying reasons why the relationships occur. This dissertation focuses on one 
important set of factors—family characteristics. Family characteristics have long been 
explicitly incorporated into the labor supply optimization problem. For example, spouse’s 
earnings and child-related factors, such as the number of children, costs of child care and 
the timing of having children, matter to the labor supply decision (Mroz 1987; Eckstein 
& Wolpin 1989; Ermisch & Wright 1993; Jacobsen et al. 1999; Tekin 2007). There are 
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reasons to believe that family characteristics might have impacts on workers’ effort 
supply as well. Another reason to focus on family characteristics is that a limited number 
of studies mentioned earlier show that family characteristics, including having a spouse 
and children, may affect work effort. However, this earlier research does not deeply 
investigate how a range of family characteristics affects workers’ effort supply decisions 
in response to incentive compensation. Furthermore, there is little existing research on the 
effects of family characteristics on workers’ job choices based on the presence of 
incentives.  
This dissertation, therefore, extends the standard model of effort to explicitly 
incorporate family characteristics into a worker’s effort supply function. The theoretical 
model in this dissertation focuses on illustrating some of the possible relationships 
between family characteristics and worker’s reactions to incentives. Specifically, family 
characteristics include the employment status of spouse, child characteristics, such as the 
number of children and the age of child, and the presence of alternative family income 
sources. These family characteristics can affect workers’ reactions to incentives through 
several possible theoretical mechanisms. Three key avenues—target income, loss 
aversion, and time and energy constraints—are included in the model. Moreover, this 
model also implies that workers with different family characteristics choose different 
types of jobs based on the presence of compensation incentives in the job.  
Motivated by the theoretical model, the reduced-form relationships between 
family characteristics and workers’ reactions to compensation incentives are analyzed 
using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the American Time 
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Use Survey (ATUS). First, the results show that workers with different family 
characteristics sort themselves into different jobs based on the presence of incentive pay 
in the job. Specifically, some family characteristics, including spouse employment status, 
the number of children, and the age of child, significantly associate with workers’ job 
choices relates to the incentive pay. Moreover, the regression results are weakly 
supportive of the importance of family characteristics on workers’ effort supply measured 
as the amount of incentive pay the worker received in their job. Furthermore, this 
dissertation explores some underlying mechanisms by which the relationships occur 
using detailed time use variables from the ATUS. The time constraints on work is 
measured as time spent on different activities including household, caring for other 
people, socializing and sports in this dissertation. The results show that the time 
constraints on work significantly associates with the workers’ reactions to incentives 
especially workers’ job choices based on the presence of incentive pay, when family 
characteristics are included in the regressions at the same time.  
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the 
current literature on effort supply and related studies on the role of family characteristics 
and briefly reviews the theory of equalizing differences; Chapter 3 presents the 
theoretical model; Chapter 4 describes the PSID and the ATUS datasets and variables and 
summary statistics of each sample; Chapter 5 presents the regressions results in terms of 
the effects of family characteristics on workers’ job choices based on incentives; Chapter 
6 reports the empirical results on the effects of family characteristics on workers’ effort 
supply; finally, Chapter 7 concludes the dissertation.   
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Chapter 2  Literature Review 
As mentioned in the Introduction, this dissertation studies two types of workers’ 
reactions to compensation incentives. The first type is workers’ decisions of making job 
choices based on whether they receive incentive pay in the job. The second type refers to 
how much effort workers put into their work. This chapter first reviews current empirical 
studies about the incentive effects on workers’ effort. Then this chapter reviews some 
related studies on the role of family characteristics, including some studies on the effects 
of family characteristics on labor supply and several existing studies about the 
relationships between family characteristics and work effort and productivity. In the end 
of this chapter, some studies on the theory of equalizing differences are briefly reviewed.  
 
2.1 Effort Supply Studies 
Usually, workers’ reactions to incentives refer to how much effort they put into 
work. In terms of workers’ effort supply, previous empirical studies have focused 
attention on how strongly workers react to different incentive schemes, including piece 
rates, tournaments, and other forms of incentives such as bonuses, efficiency wages, and 
team incentives. Then employers can design different types of reward programs to 
motivate workers based on workers’ reactions to different types of incentives.  
Specifically, there is evidence showing that piece rates can induce workers’ effort 
and raise their productivity (Lazear 2000; Paarsch & Shearer 2000; Shearer 2004; 
Freeman & Kleiner 2005).  For example, Lazear (2000) uses data from the Safelite Glass 
Corporation to estimate the incentive effects on productivity of a change from fixed 
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wages to piece rates in the compensation system. The results show that the switch from 
wage to piece-rate pay caused a 44 percent increase in productivity (i.e., output per 
worker) and half of the increase in productivity was from the incentive effects (i.e., the 
average workers producing more due to the piece rates). Consistent with Lazear’s results, 
Paarsch & Shearer (2000) find that incentives caused a 22.6 percent increase in 
productivity using daily data collected from the payroll records of a British Columbia 
tree-planting firm and Shearer (2004) also finds a 20 percent increase in worker 
productivity when workers are paid piece rates rather than fixed wages using data from a 
field experiment. As well, Freeman & Kleiner (2005) show that the switch from piece 
rate to time rate modes of compensation increased profits but decreased productivity. In 
addition, piece rates could produce wage premiums for piece-rate workers if piece rates 
raised worker’s productivity (Seiler 1984; Brown 1992; Parent 1999). For instance, Seiler 
(1984), Brown (1992), and Parent (1999) all find that piece-rate workers earned more, on 
average, than fixed wages or time-rated workers due to a direct incentive effects on 
effort. In each of those papers, the authors use a large data set—data from the U.S. 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Industry Wages Surveys (Seiler 1984 and Brown 1992) or a 
wave of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (Parent 1999)—to compare workers’ 
performances under different compensation systems (i.e., piece rates and fixed wages or 
time-rated wages).  
Moreover, some studies have shown that tournaments have incentive effects on an 
individual’s performance such as workers’ output (Knoeber 1989; Ehrenberg & 
Bognanno 1990 a, 1990 b; Becker & Huselid 1992; Knoeber & Thurman 1994). For 
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example, using data from the 1984 United States Professional Golf Association (PGA) 
Tour and from the 1987 European PGA Tour, Ehrenberg & Bognanno (1990 a, 1990 b) 
find strong evidence that the level and structure of prizes in PGA tournaments influence 
players’ performance. Specifically, the higher is the total prize money in a tournament, 
the lower are the player’s scores, in other words, the higher is their output and effort. 
Following Ehrenberg & Bognanno (1990 a, 1990 b), Becker & Huselid (1992) show that 
the tournament spread has incentive effects on individual performance using a panel data 
set from auto racing, but they also find that the prize distribution has little influence on 
individual performance. These results support that tournaments have incentive effects on 
individual’s output. There are few studies testing the tournament theory outside the sports 
context. Knoeber (1989) and Knoeber & Thurman (1994) study the broiler chicken 
industry, in which explicit tournaments are used to reward contract producers of broiler 
chickens. The results of these two papers support the predictions of tournament theory, 
especially that the level of prize has positive effects on producer’s performance measured 
as the weight of chickens.  
Besides piece rates and tournaments, workers also respond to other forms of 
compensation incentives, such as bonuses, efficiency wages and team incentives that 
reward their efforts and performance (Prendergast 1999; Bandiera et al. 2007). For 
example, Groshen & Krueger (1990) use BLS data on 300 hospitals in 1985 to test the 
relationship between supervision and efficiency wages. In the paper, Groshen and 
Krueger find evidence to support the efficiency wage theory: if the firms pay workers 
wages higher than the average market, then the cost of job loss is large, so workers would 
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exert effort instead of shirking at the efficient level. Additionally, studies consistently 
show that using profit-sharing plans including Employee Stock-Ownership Plans and 
bonuses, which is one of the most used team compensation schemes, increases the firm’s 
productivity by 4-5 percent with available estimates, especially compared with the firms 
that do not use these schemes (Knez & Simester 1992; Kruse 1993; Jones & Kato 1995).  
However, although previous studies provide evidence that incentives have 
significant effects on workers’ effort and productivity, they didn’t explore what factors 
influence workers’ effort supply decisions. Moreover, these studies have only paid 
attention to one type of workers’ reactions to incentives: how much effort workers put 
into work.    
 
2.2 Related Studies on the Role of Family Characteristics 
Because there are limitations of the empirical effort supply studies and the 
standard model of effort supply, it is essential to further understand what factors 
influence workers’ heterogeneous reactions to compensation incentives. Moreover, 
several factors could have impacts on workers’ reactions to incentives, and this 
dissertation focuses on exploring the role of one important set of factors—family 
characteristics, such as the employment status of spouse and child characteristics. One 
reason is that family characteristics have long been explicitly incorporated into the labor 
supply optimization problem. There is sufficient evidence showing that family 
characteristics are key determinants of workers’ labor supply. Thus, we have reasons to 
believe that family characteristics could influence workers’ decisions on effort supply 
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and job choices as well. Another reason for focusing on family characteristics in this 
dissertation is that a limited number of studies show that some family characteristics may 
affect work effort and productivity. Therefore, we need further study on the relationships 
between a range of family characteristics and workers’ reactions to incentives, including 
not only workers’ decisions on effort supply but also workers’ job choices based on the 
presence of incentive pay in the job. This section reviews related labor supply studies 
especially studies on the effects of family characteristics on labor supply and current 
studies about relationships between family characteristics and work effort and 
productivity.  
 
2.2.1 Related Labor Supply Studies 
In the labor supply literature, family characteristics have long been explicitly 
modeled into the labor supply maximization problem. Previous studies have shown that 
spouse’s earnings and child-related factors, such as the number of children, costs of child 
care, and the timing of having children, matter to workers’ labor supply decision 
(Eckstein & Wolpin 1989; Jacobsen et al. 1999; Lundberg & Rose 2002).  
For example, Eckstein & Wolpin (1989) present a dynamic model of married 
women’s labor force participation and fertility. They use the National Longitudinal 
Surveys to estimate the effects of schooling, fertility, husband’s income and work 
experience on wages. They find that the presence of young children substantially reduces 
women’s future labor force participation; while the number of years of women’s 
schooling has positive effects on their participation.  
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Jacobsen et al. (1999) use twin births as a natural experiment to test the effects of 
fertility timing (i.e., an unplanned birth child) on married women’s labor supply. The 
results show a small but still statistically significant impact of an unplanned birth on 
married women’s labor supply behavior and earnings and especially significant short-run 
effects of fertility shocks on labor supply and earnings. But they don’t find significant 
impacts of having twins in the first birth on the occupational choices of married women.  
Meanwhile, few studies have attempted to provide evidence on the effects of 
marital status and parenthood on men’s labor supply. For example, Lundberg & Rose 
(2002) use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to examine the effects 
of having children on men’s labor supply and hourly wages. They find that having a child 
significantly increases the hourly wage rates and annul hours of work for men. 
Specifically, on average, a child increases a man’s annual hours of work by 38 hours per 
year. But the significant positive incremental effects of children are limited to the first 
two children according to their results.  
Moreover, some studies show evidence that family characteristics could influence 
people’s choices of labor supply, especially choosing either full-time or part-time jobs. 
For instance, Tekin (2007) examines the effects of the price of child care and wages on 
the part-time and full-time employment decision. Using data from the 1997 National 
Survey of America’s Families, he finds that the childcare price has a significant negative 
effect on the overall employment for single mothers and the full-time wage rate has a 
positive effect on the overall employment for single mothers. His results also indicate that 
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single mothers who are employed full-time are more sensitive to the price of childcare 
than those who are employed part-time.  
 
2.2.2 Studies about Family Characteristics and Work Effort and Productivity  
As mentioned earlier, some existing empirical evidence shows that there might be 
relationships between some factors including family characteristics and people’s work 
effort, productivity and career outcomes. Researchers have been trying to explore the 
effects of family characteristics on workers’ job behaviors and performance. For 
example, Becker (1985) develops a model of energy allocation, which asserts that 
different activities demand different energies on the basis that the energy of a person is 
limited. If the person spends more energy on non-work activities such as household 
activities, caring for family members and leisure, he or she will have less energy to spend 
on work. According to Becker’s model, married women could spend less effort on each 
hour of market work than married men, even when they work the same number of hours, 
if they need to spend more energy on non-work activities. Effort is defined as the amount 
of physical and mental energy devoted to work in Becker’s model. Becker’s reasoning is 
that child care and housework demand more effort than leisure and other household 
activities and those activities demand more energy from women than men. But Becker’s 
work does not rely on any empirical research.  
Related to Becker’s model, researchers have done several empirical studies to 
provide evidence on factors affecting worker’s effort. For example, there is a debate on 
the topic whether having a child influences worker’s job performance or not. Some 
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studies show that having a child may affect self-reported effort or energy put into work. 
One study is done by Bielby and Bielby (1988). They find that having preschool-age 
children reduces mothers’ self-reported work effort, using data from the 1973 and 1977 
Quality of Employment Surveys. But they don’t find significant effects of having school-
age children on work effort for either men or women. In their study, the self-reported 
work effort is a composite measure as the mean of the sum of three items, each measured 
on a scale ranging from one to four. The first item is: “My job requires that I work very 
hard.” The second one is: “Altogether, how much effort, either physical or mental, does 
your job require?” And the third time is: “And how much effort do you put into your job 
beyond what is required.” However, some research doesn’t find significant evidence in 
terms of the effects of having a child on work effort. For instance, Kmec (2011) uses data 
from the second wave of the National Survey of Midlife Development in the U.S. to 
compare some pro-work behaviors, such as work effort, work intensity and job 
engagement, among mothers, fathers, and non-parents. He does not find differences 
between mothers and non-parents of both sexes on self-reported work effort, holding net 
of all individual, job and family controls. In his study, the self-reported work effort is 
measured by the respondent’s answer to the question: “Using a 0-10 scale where 0 means 
‘no thought or effort’ and 10 means ‘very much thought and effort,’ how much thought 
and effort do you put into your work situation these days?” 
Moreover, some research has shown that family characteristics may affect 
worker’s productivity (see Manchester, Leslie & Dahm 2014). One related phenomenon 
is that there is a well-known marital wage premium for men. Researchers have long 
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noticed that married men earn substantially more per hour worked than men who are not 
currently married. Generally, married men appear to earn 10% to 20% more than 
comparable single men, even doing the same job (Korenman & Neumark 1991; Ginther 
& Zavodny 2001). For example, Korenman & Neumark (1991) present descriptive 
statistical evidence showing that never-married or single men appear to have much lower 
wages than married and divorced or separated men using the National Longitudinal 
Survey (NLS) of Young Men. They also find significant annual earnings differentials 
(about 12 percent marriage premiums) between single men and married and divorced 
men using cross-sectional data from a company personnel file. Ginther & Zavodny 
(2001) also report a large positive return to marriage for white men from their cross-
sectional estimates. But there has been disagreement about why the marital wage 
premium for men exists among researchers. One possible reason of the marriage 
premium for men is that marriage increases men’s productivity so that married men could 
work harder and earn more per hour; in other words, marriage makes workers more 
productive (Greenhalgh 1980; Kenny 1983; Becker 1985).  
However, there are several limitations of current research about the relationships 
between factors including family characteristics and worker’s effort and performance. 
First, although those studies have shown that family characteristics might affect worker’s 
effort and productivity, they are not in the context of compensation incentives. Second, 
this earlier research does not deeply investigate how a range of family characteristics 
affects workers’ effort supply decisions in response to incentive compensation. Most of 
the studies focus on one or two family characteristics and examine their effects on 
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worker’s performances. Third, to my knowledge, there is limited existing research on the 
effects of family characteristics on workers’ job choices based on the presence of 
incentives, which is also a type of workers’ reactions to incentives.  
 
2.3 Brief Review on the Theory of Equalizing Differences 
As mentioned above, workers might also react to compensation incentives by 
choosing different jobs based on whether they receive incentive pay in the job. One 
possible reason is that workers choose jobs with different attributes on the basis of their 
preferences for those attributes, according to the theory of equalizing differences (Brown 
1980; Rosen 1986). The theory of equalizing differences states that workers are willing to 
accept less attractive jobs if the employers compensate through differences in wage rates 
(Brown 1980). Rosen (1986, pp. 641) defines the theory of equalizing differences as 
“observed wage differentials required to equalize the total monetary and nonmonetary 
advantages or disadvantages among work activities and among workers themselves”. 
Thus, workers with given personal characteristics make choices among jobs with 
different wage and non-wage attributes (Brown 1980).  
Empirical studies have tested the theory of equalizing differences, especially a 
central point that workers sort into jobs with different attributes based on their 
preferences (Brown 1980; DeLeire & Levy 2004; Grazier & Sloane 2008; Krueger & 
Schkade 2008). Measurable job attributes include working conditions such as risks to life 
and health and working environments, job requirements such as special work-time 
scheduling, worker skills, and the composition of pay packages such as vacations, 
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pensions, and other fringe benefits. For example, Brown (1980) develops a model of 
labor market choice that emphasizes equalizing differences and uses the longitudinal data 
from the NLS Young Men’s sample to test the model. The empirical results show that the 
risk of death has a significantly positive relationship with wages, the repetitive work and 
bad working conditions have negative effects on wages. But after including the 
individual-specific intercepts in the regressions, the risk of death variable loses its 
significant positive effects and the effects of repetitive work and bad working conditions 
become less negative. Thus, Brown’s results did not provide sufficient significant 
evidence that the job characteristics might generate equalizing differences. Moreover, 
using data from multiple sources including the March Current Population Surveys and the 
Dictionary of Occupational Titles, DeLeire and Levy (2004) estimate conditional logit 
models of occupation choice as a function of the risk of death on the job. The risk of 
death on the job is measured as injury risk and other job attributes such as job requiring 
physical strength, working environments, and creative skills. Their empirical analysis 
shows a significant positive relationship between a worker’s low willingness to trade 
risks and safety for wages and occupations with low earnings risk. In the analysis, they 
use family structure as a proxy for willingness to trade risk and safety in the job for 
wages. Their results support the hypothesis that workers sort into jobs on the basis of 
their preferences. Following DeLeire and Levy (2004) for the U.S., Grazier and Sloane 
(2008) also find that the death and major injury rate of an occupation has a significant 
effect on workers’ occupational choices in the U.K., using data from multiple datasets 
including the Labour Force Survey, Health and Safety Executive, and the Skills Survey in 
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U.K. As well, Krueger and Schkade (2008) present evidence to support the sorting 
hypothesis of workers choosing jobs based on individual characteristics and job attributes 
using data from the U.S. and France. Their results show that workers who are more 
gregarious tend to be employed in jobs that involve more social interactions. They use 
workers’ behaviors when they are not working such as how they spend their time to infer 
their preferences.  
Therefore, according to the theory of equalizing differences and related empirical 
evidence, if differences across workers affect the attractiveness of different incentive 
plans, then workers should sort themselves into jobs based on whether they receive 
incentives in the job.  
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Chapter 3  Theoretical Model 
This chapter first focuses on presenting the standard effort supply model and the 
limitations of the model. Second, this chapter describes the theoretical linkages between 
three theoretical mechanisms and effort supply and then the theoretical relationships 
between family characteristics and these mechanisms. Moreover, this chapter presents the 
completed extended theoretical model, which is illustrative, that incorporates family 
characteristics and theoretical mechanisms into the effort supply function. Last, the 
extended model for a particular job is presented and the implied theoretical relationships 
between family characteristics and workers’ job choices based on the presence of 
incentives on the basis of the extended model is also described in this chapter.  
 
 3.1 Standard Effort Supply Model and Limitations 
Theoretically, the economic literature has paid a lot of attention to how to model 
worker’s effort supply. This section presents the standard theoretical model of effort 
supply and discusses several limitations of the model. In the literature, the worker’s effort 
optimization problem is modeled as maximizing the utility function: 
max
{𝑒}
  𝑈(𝑤(𝑒), 𝑒) = 𝑤(𝑒) − 𝑐(𝑒) 
𝑠. 𝑡.    𝑈(𝑤(𝑒), 𝑒) ≥ 𝑢        
where  
 𝑈(. ) is the utility function 
 e is worker effort 
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 w(.) is the pay function of effort from the firm through the compensation 
scheme 
 c(.) is the disutility/cost function of effort, which is increasing and convex in e 
 u is the reservation utility of the worker. 
The solution of this maximization problem is e*, which is the worker’s optimal effort 
level. In this standard model of effort supply, the worker chooses the level of effort that 
maximizes their utility function after observing the compensation scheme. The 
compensation including wage and incentives is offered by the firm through some specific 
mechanisms (Prendergast 1999). At the same time, the worker will decide whether to 
participate in exerting effort by comparing utility derived from the offered incentive with 
the outside options. The worker will take the current incentive only if it ensures a utility 
level, which is as high as the outside utility level (i.e., the reservation utility). In other 
words, the worker will make the decision on the basis of the satisfied participation 
constraint. Thus, the worker’s optimal effort level will be achieved when the marginal 
benefit of effort equals the marginal cost of effort, under these given constraints.  
However, as noted previously in this dissertation, there are several limitations of 
the standard approach to modeling effort supply. First, the determination of the workers’ 
marginal utility of income and disutility of effort (i.e., the marginal cost of effort) is taken 
as given and unaddressed in the standard model. The determination affects the workers’ 
levels of effort supply. Moreover, the determinants of the marginal benefit of income and 
marginal cost of effort might vary across workers. There are other factors, such as family 
characteristics, which might influence the marginal benefit of income and the marginal 
  20 
cost of effort. Then the workers would choose different levels of effort when they face 
the same compensation incentives. But the standard model just ignores those potential 
determinants of marginal utility of income and the disutility of effort.  
Second, the determinants of the worker’s time and energy are not explicitly 
modeled. In the standard model of effort, the worker’s time and energy constraints for 
work are captured by the disutility function of effort. Thus, the role of time and energy 
constraints in the effort supply problem can’t be explicitly analyzed. But time and energy 
is likely critical to a worker’s decisions on how hard to work. For instance, if you have to 
spend a lot of your time and energy on non-work activities such as taking care of children 
and household activities, then you would have less time and energy you could spend on 
work. In this case, your effort level is constrained because of your limited time and 
energy. Therefore, it’s important to explicitly model the determinants of the worker’s 
time and energy, such as family characteristics, and analyze the effects of the 
determinants on worker’s effort through the time and energy constraints on work.  
Third, the standard model of effort supply does not recognize that workers should 
make job choices based on whether they receive incentives in the job. If differences 
across workers affect the attractiveness of different incentive plans, then we should also 
recognize that workers would choose different jobs associated with the presence of 
incentive pay in the job. According to the theory of equalizing differences (Brown 1980; 
Rosen 1986), workers should sort themselves into jobs with different attributes, such as 
working environments, worker skills and other job requirements, based on their 
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preferences for those attributes. But the standard model doesn’t consider this type of 
workers’ reactions to compensations incentives.  
 
3.2 Theoretical Linkages between Family Characteristics, Theoretical Mechanisms 
and Effort Supply 
As explained in previous section 2.2, it’s essential for us to further understand 
what factors influence workers’ heterogeneous reactions to compensation incentives due 
to the limitations of the standard model of effort and current empirical studies. This 
dissertation focuses on family characteristics for one main reason that there is an 
important set of family characteristics such as the employment status of spouse and child-
related characteristics, which might play a significant role, but has not been studied in the 
literature of effort supply. To explore the role of family characteristics in shaping 
workers’ reactions to compensation incentives, this dissertation proposes that family 
characteristics might affect workers’ effort supply decision through three theoretical 
mechanisms: worker’s target income, loss aversion, and time and energy constraints on 
work. This section describes the theoretical linkages between the three mechanisms and 
effort supply and the theoretical linkages between family characteristics and the three 
mechanisms, separately. 
 
3.2.1 Theoretical Linkages between Theoretical Mechanisms and Effort Supply 
A number of potential factors could have impacts on a worker’s marginal benefit 
of income and marginal cost of effort. Rather than taking the determination of an 
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individual’s marginal utility of income and the disutility of effort as given, this 
dissertation includes three possible theoretical mechanisms—target income, loss 
aversion, and time and energy constraints on work—as determinants of worker’s 
marginal benefit of income and marginal cost of effort in the model. Specifically, the 
target income and loss aversion might influence an individual’s marginal utility of 
income; while the third mechanism—time and energy constraints on work—can affect an 
individual’s disutility of effort. Therefore, these three theoretical mechanisms can affect 
effort supply by influencing the marginal utility of income and the disutility of effort. 
 
3.2.1.1 Theoretical Relationships between Target Income and Worker’s Effort 
The first factor I add to the standard model is target income, which would 
influence the worker’s marginal utility of income. Everyone might have his or her own 
target income. The same incentive could have different impacts on effort supply due to 
different target incomes people have. According to the reference dependent preferences 
model, workers, especially the ones exhibiting loss-averse preferences, might have a 
reference point or reference level (Fehr & Goette 2007). The reference point could be a 
variety of things, such as expected earnings and expected time spent on work, set by the 
individual. In the model of this dissertation, the reference point is the target income the 
individual expects in order to meet his or her financial needs. After observing the 
compensation scheme provided by the firm, rather than comparing only with the cost of 
effort, workers also compare their received incomes with their own target incomes. Thus, 
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heterogeneous workers would treat the same income differently due to the differences 
between the received income and different target incomes they have.  
Moreover, the distance between the income and the target income is hypothesized 
to affect the strength of the incentive to a particular worker. The literature suggests that 
the person would experience an additional psychological cost if she or he falls short of 
the target (Bell 1985; Loomes & Sugden 1986; Delquie & Cillo 2006; Koszegi & Rabin 
2006, 2007; Fehr & Goette 2007). Workers who are below their target reference income 
will perceive their current performance as a loss, so that they exert more effort to increase 
their performance (Heath, Larrick & Wu 1999; Fehr & Goette 2007). In this case, 
workers would work harder to earn more from the incentive pay so that they can catch up 
to their target incomes. Thus, workers with different target incomes would choose 
different optimal effort levels, even though the compensation incentive appears to be the 
same, holding other things the same.  
Therefore, after incorporating the target income into the standard model of effort 
supply, the worker’s utility function is turned into the following format: 
𝑈 = 𝑤(𝑒) − 𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑒) 
where T is the reference target income.  
 
3.2.1.2 Theoretical Relationships between Loss Aversion and Worker’s Effort 
Another factor—the degree of loss aversion—is added into the model as a factor 
affecting the worker’s effort supply by influencing the marginal benefit of income, 
combined with target income. Individuals with loss aversion would feel more strongly 
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about avoiding a loss of one unit than making a gain (Kahneman & Tversky 1979; 
Goette, Huffman & Fehr 2004). As mentioned earlier, the person would experience an 
additional psychological cost if falling short of the target income; while it will not happen 
if above the target. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the individual has stronger loss 
aversion when the received income is below the target than above the target income. In 
the extended model of this dissertation, the degree of loss aversion is set up as larger than 
one only if the received income is below the worker’s target income; while the degree of 
loss aversion is set up as one if the income is equal or above the worker’s target income.  
Moreover, individuals exhibiting different degrees of loss aversion place different 
levels of importance on the same level of target income. Usually, the stronger the loss 
aversion is, the more important it is to achieve the target income level. The worker with 
higher degree of loss aversion will feel more strongly about avoiding a loss and suffer a 
larger psychological loss from not meeting the target income, than the one with lower 
degree of loss aversion. In this situation, workers with higher degree of loss aversion 
would work harder to catch up with the target income (Gill & Prowse 2012). Thus, 
workers even with the same level of target income choose different levels of effort, due to 
different degrees of loss aversion they have. 
The presence of loss aversion requires uncertainty. If there is no uncertainty, then 
people will work hard enough to get their target income, and with the necessary level of 
effort they reach their target with certainty. One possible source of the uncertainty is the 
random difficulty of reaching a certain performance level, which could be the worker’s 
  25 
target income. This could be uncertain due to economic shocks, uncertain supervisor 
evaluations, or outcomes that depend on co-worker behaviors. 
Thus, combining with the target income, after adding the loss aversion into the 
model, the worker’s utility function is as follows: 
𝑈 = {
𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂), 𝑖𝑓 𝑤(𝑒) ≥ 𝑇
𝛾[𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇] − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂), 𝑖𝑓  𝑤(𝑒) < 𝑇
 
where the loss aversion  𝛾 = 1  if 𝑤(𝑒) ≥ 𝑇  and 𝛾 > 1  if 𝑤(𝑒) < 𝑇 ; p is a worker’s 
performance observed by the employer; 𝜂 is the random difficulty of reaching a certain 
performance level.  
 
3.2.1.3 Theoretical Relationships between Time and Energy Constraints on Work 
and Worker’s Effort 
The third factor incorporated in the model as a potential determinant of the 
worker’s marginal cost of effort is the worker’s time and energy constraints on work. In 
the standard model of effort supply, the constraints of time and energy are captured by 
the disutility function of effort c(e). But the previous literature does not pay much 
attention to how the function c(e) is determined. This dissertation considers time and 
energy constraints on work as one possible determinant of the disutility function of effort 
on the basis of the assumption that different activities might demand different quantities 
of energy (Becker 1985). According to the assumption, energy is allocated among various 
household and market activities and the total amount of an individual’s energy is limited. 
Thus, resource constraints for work depend on the allocation of time and energy among 
all activities. The more resources demanded and spent on non-work activities such as 
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household work, taking care of children, and leisure, the less time and energy available 
for work. More time and energy constraints on work, in turn, will decrease the inputs into 
effort supply and increase the cost of effort. In this case, the worker couldn’t put more 
effort into work even if he or she wants to, due to the time and energy constraints on 
work. So facing the same incentive, a worker will exert less effort when she or he has less 
time and energy to put into work. 
Therefore, after adding time and energy constraints on work into the model, the 
worker’s utility function is as follows: 
𝑈 = {
𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇 − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂; 𝑡, 𝐸), 𝑖𝑓 𝑤(𝑒) ≥ 𝑇
𝛾[𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇] − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂;  𝑡, 𝐸), 𝑖𝑓  𝑤(𝑒) < 𝑇
 
where t is the time constraint on work and E is the energy constraint on work.  
 
3.2.2 Theoretical Linkages between Family Characteristics and Theoretical 
Mechanisms 
Through the three theoretical mechanisms, family characteristics (i.e., the 
employment status of spouse, child characteristics including the number of children and 
the age of child, and the presence of alternative family income sources) might have 
effects on workers’ effort supply. This section describes the potential theoretical linkages 
between these family characteristics and the three mechanisms to explain how the family 
characteristics could affect the three theoretical avenues.  
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3.2.2.1 Theoretical Relationships between Family Characteristics and Target 
Income 
These family characteristics could influence the worker’s target income as 
follows:  
First, the employment status of a worker’s spouse might have positive or negative 
effects on the individual’s target income. For example, having a working spouse would 
decrease the worker’s target income due to several possible reasons: one reason is that the 
working spouse could reduce the individual’s financial pressure by having earnings to 
help family’s financial needs. To the opposite, having a stay-at-home spouse could 
increase the worker’s financial pressure if the financial needs of the family will not 
change. In this case, the worker would have higher target income to achieve.  
Second, child-related characteristics could influence the worker’s target income as 
well. For instance, the number of children might have positive effects on the individual’s 
target income. The reason could be that the number of children positively associates with 
the financial needs of the family since more children demand more money, holding the 
other conditions the same. Then the worker needs to earn more from work to meet the 
financial needs. In other words, the reference target income increases. Moreover, having 
different ages of children might influence the worker’s target income. The financial needs 
of different ages of children vary from different sources. For example, having a very 
young child needs money in terms of childcare activities; while having a school-aged 
child needs money to afford education. So the amount of financial needs would vary due 
to different circumstances and then the amount of financial needs would influence the 
worker’s target income.  
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Third, having alternative family income sources would decrease the worker’s 
target income. If there are alternatives of family income sources, then the family income 
will be increased. At the same time, holding other conditions the same, the financial 
needs of the family will not change. Then the worker could earn less from work to meet 
the financial needs. In other words, the reference target income decreases.  
 
3.2.2.2 Theoretical Relationships between Family Characteristics and Loss Aversion 
The degree of loss aversion can vary across individuals with different family 
characteristics due to the following possible relationships: 
First, the employment status of spouse would influence the worker’s degree of 
loss aversion. Specifically, the worker who has a stay-at-home spouse might exhibit 
stronger loss aversion than the worker who does not have a spouse or the worker who has 
a working spouse. The reason could be that the worker who has a stay-at-home spouse 
worries more to fall behind the target income, because the financial loss (i.e., not catching 
up with the target) would affect both the worker and the spouse, holding target income 
and other things constant. But the worker without a spouse does not need to worry about 
influencing another person; while the worker with a working spouse might feel less 
stressful of the financial loss, because she or he could have additional financial support 
from the earnings of the working spouse.  
Second, the number of children might positively associate with the worker’s loss 
aversion. The more children the worker has, the stronger feeling she or he has to avoid a 
loss. One possible reason is that having more children makes the worker more afraid of 
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not meeting the target, because the financial loss would influence not only her or him but 
also the children, especially compared with the worker who does not have a child.  
Third, the presence of alternative family income sources might be negatively 
associated with the worker’s degree of loss aversion. If the worker has alternative family 
income, then she or he would have fewer financial pressures and would exhibit weaker 
loss aversion, compared with the worker who doesn’t have any other income resources. 
In addition, future work could theoretically explore the possibility that the random 
difficulty of reaching a performance level is a function of family characteristics as well.  
 
3.2.2.3 Theoretical Relationships between Family Characteristics and Time and 
Energy Constraints on Work 
Time and energy constraints on work could be influenced by family 
characteristics as follows: 
First, the employment status of spouse might have bidirectional effects on the 
individual’s time and energy constraints on work. According to the “wife/spouse as a 
resource” theory (Talbert & Boss 1977), the traditional stay-at-home wife could increase 
the productivity of her spouse through several possible channels, such as reducing his 
household responsibilities which leaves him more available for work and providing 
emotional support. Thus, the stay-at-home spouse could increase the worker’s resources 
for work; in other words, reduce the worker’s time and energy constraints on work. 
Conversely, in the presence of having a working spouse, the worker needs to take more 
household responsibilities and workload compared with the worker having a stay-at-
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home spouse. Thus, the worker would have fewer available resources for work and more 
time and energy constraints on work.  
Second, child-related characteristics might affect the worker’s time and energy 
constraints on work. For example, having children demands time and energy from the 
worker to take care of, play with or educate children. The more children the worker has, 
the more time and energy need to spend on children, and then the less time and energy 
could spend on work. Thus, the number of children might have a positive relationship 
with time and energy constraints on work. Moreover, having different ages of children 
demands different amount of time and energy depends on different activities needed from 
the parents. For example, having relative younger children demands more resources for 
childcare activities so that the available amount of time and energy for work will 
decrease; in other words, the time and energy constraints on work will increase. As well, 
having school-aged children demands more time and energy from parents on education-
related activities so that the available amount of time and energy for work will decrease.  
 
3.3 Extended Theoretical Model 
3.3.1 Theoretical Model of Family Characteristics and Effort Supply 
On the basis of the theoretical linkages between the three mechanisms and 
worker’s effort supply and the theoretical relationships between these family 
characteristics and three theoretical mechanisms, this dissertation develops a full 
theoretical model of effort supply, which incorporates these family characteristics and the 
three mechanisms. This extended model is intended to be illustrative and motivational, 
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not a structural model to be estimated. That is, this model focuses on showing some 
possible relationships between family characteristics and workers’ reactions to incentives 
in order to motivate the empirical analyses, but except for time and energy constraints, 
these specific theoretical channels are not directly tested in the empirical analyses. 
Therefore, firstly the standard utility function 𝑈 = 𝑤(𝑒) − 𝑐(𝑒) can be extended 
by explicitly modeling the importance of family characteristics (i.e., the employment 
status of spouse, child characteristics, and the presence of alternative family income 
sources) via three theoretical avenues: target income, loss aversion, and time and energy 
constraints as follows: 
𝑈
= {
[𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)] − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂; 𝑡(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷), 𝐸(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷) ),                                     𝑖𝑓 𝑤(𝑒) ≥ 𝑇
𝛾(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)[𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)] − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂; 𝑡(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷), 𝐸(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷)), 𝑖𝑓  𝑤(𝑒) < 𝑇
 
where  
 𝑈(. ) is the utility function 
 w(.) is the pay function  
 p(.) is the function of performance observed by the firm 
 e is worker effort 
 𝜂 is the random difficulty of reaching a certain performance level 
 T(.) is the reference target income function 
 S is the spouse’s employment status 
 CHD is a set of child characteristics including the ages and the number of 
children  
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 ALTINC is the presence of alternative family income sources 
 c(.) is the cost function  
 t(.) is the time constraint function  
 E(.) is the energy constraint function 
 𝛾 measures the degree of loss aversion function; 𝛾 = 1 if 𝑤(𝑒) ≥ 𝑇 while 𝛾 > 1 
if 𝑤(𝑒) < 𝑇. 
This extended descriptive utility function yields the maximization problem of 
worker’s effort supply as: 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
{𝑒}
 𝐸(𝑈) = 𝐸{ 𝛾(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)[𝑤(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)] − 𝑐(𝑒, 𝜂;  𝑡(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷), 𝐸(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷))} 
 𝑠. 𝑡.     𝑈 ≥ 𝑢        
where  
 E(U) is the expected utility 
 𝛾 = 1 if 𝑤(𝑒) ≥ 𝑇 ; 𝛾 > 1 if 𝑤(𝑒) < 𝑇 
 u is the reservation utility of the worker. 
The solution of this maximization problem is the worker’s optimal effort level e*. This 
new model is not a structural model to be estimated; instead, the model captures the 
possible relationships between family characteristics and the worker’s decision of effort 
supply in the context of incentives, through three important mechanisms. Thus, workers 
with different family characteristics may choose different levels of effort when facing the 
same incentives, due to the potential linkages between family characteristics and effort 
supply.   
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3.3.2 Theoretical Linkages between Family Characteristics and Job Choices 
Generally, different jobs have different types of pay function. Also, a worker 
might have different cost function, target income and degrees of loss aversion if the 
worker has different jobs. Thus, for a particular job j (i.e., the job index) when having the 
variable incentive pay, the worker’s utility function is:  
𝑈 =  𝛾𝑗 (𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)[𝑤𝑗(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇𝑗 (𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)] − 𝑐𝑗(𝑒, 𝜂;  𝑡(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷), 𝐸(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷)) 
which implies that the utility levels vary across jobs for a particular worker. Therefore, 
the worker chooses different types of jobs based on different levels of utility related to 
incentive pay in the job.  
Moreover, the worker also chooses different levels of effort to maximize the 
utility for each job. The extended maximization problem for a particular job j is:  
max
{𝑒}
𝐸(𝑈) =  𝐸{𝛾𝑗(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)[𝑤𝑗(𝑝(𝑒, 𝜂)) − 𝑇𝑗(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷, 𝐴𝐿𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶)] − 𝑐𝑗(𝑒, 𝜂;  𝑡(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷), 𝐸(𝑆, 𝐶𝐻𝐷))} 
𝑠. 𝑡.     𝑈 ≥ 𝑢        
Furthermore, on the basis of the theoretical linkages between family 
characteristics and a worker’s effort supply decision in the extended model for a 
particular job and the theory of equalizing differences (Brown 1980; Rosen 1986), family 
characteristics could also affect workers’ decisions on making job choices based on the 
presence of incentive pay in the job before starting the jobs, through the three 
mechanisms.  
For example, a worker having a stay-at-home spouse might be more likely to 
choose the job with incentives. One possible reason is that the worker might have higher 
target income, stronger loss aversion, and less time and energy constraints on work so 
  34 
that she or he could put more effort to earn more from the incentive pay. While a worker 
having a working spouse might be more likely to choose the job without incentives due to 
the lower target income to achieve and more time and energy constraints on work.  
Moreover, the number of children might have bidirectional effects on a worker’s 
job choices based on incentives. Specifically, a worker having more children might 
choose a job with incentives because she or he needs more money to meet higher target 
income and she or he wants to earn more from the incentive pay by working harder if 
they could have the job. However, there are chances that this worker having more 
children might choose a job without incentive pay. One possible reason is that having 
more children demands more time and energy and leaves the worker fewer resources for 
work. In this case, the worker would not choose the job with incentives because she or he 
could not put more effort to earn more from the incentive pay due to the constraints. 
Also, having children at different ages might influence the workers’ job choices based on 
incentives. For instance, a worker having an older child would sort herself or himself into 
jobs with incentives because of less time and energy constraints on work comparing with 
the worker having a younger child demands more time and energy for childcare activities.   
In addition, a worker having alternative family income sources might be more 
likely to choose the job without the presence of incentives, for the reason that the worker 
might have lower target income so that she or he doesn’t need to earn more from the 
incentive pay.  
Therefore, to sum up, the extended theoretical model could predict that workers 
with different family characteristics react differently to compensation incentives, 
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including making effort supply decisions and making job choices based on the presence 
of incentives in the job, through several channels. In the model, theoretical mechanisms 
involve target income, loss aversion, and time and energy constraints on work, which 
influence workers’ decisions on job choices and their levels of effort. Furthermore, since 
these theoretical possibilities between family characteristics, theoretical mechanisms, 
workers’ job choices and effort supply illustrated in the theoretical model are uncertain, 
the reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and workers’ reactions to 
compensation incentives need empirical testing.  
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Chapter 4  Data  
In order to analyze the reduced-form relationships between family characteristics 
and worker’s reactions to compensation incentives, this dissertation conducts the analysis 
using data from two sources—the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) and the 
American Time Use Survey (ATUS). One difficulty of doing the empirical analysis is to 
measure worker’s effort supply. Ideally, it would be better to observe how much real 
effort workers put into work. But it is very hard to observe and measure each worker’s 
effort including working hours, working intensity and working energy in the job, 
especially in a large representative sample. Therefore, instead, this dissertation measures 
worker’s effort supply as the amount of incentive pay the worker received in the job. The 
underlying assumption is that the amount of incentive pay positively associates with the 
worker’s level of effort put into the job. In other words, the more effort the worker exerts, 
the more she or he will earn from the incentive pay. Thus, the amount of incentive pay is 
used as the proxy of worker’s effort supply in this analysis. Moreover, following the 
same logic, this dissertation measures worker’s job choice based on incentives as the 
presence of incentive pay in the job. If the worker has received incentive pay from the 
job, then this analysis assumes that the worker chose the job with incentives. Otherwise, 
it assumes that the worker chose the job without incentives.  
Both the PSID and the ATUS datasets used in this dissertation contain 
information on the presence of incentive pay in the job, the amount of incentive pay 
workers received in their job, and these family characteristics including the employment 
status of spouse, the number of children, and the ages of children. This chapter describes 
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the PSID dataset, measurements of key variables using the PSID and summary statistics 
of the PSID sample and four sub-samples used in this dissertation in section 4.1; and then 
describes the ATUS dataset, measurements of key variables using the ATUS and 
summary statistics of the ATUS sample used in the analysis in section 4.2.  
 
4.1 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (1975-2010) 
4.1.1 Brief Introduction to the PSID 
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) is the longest running longitudinal 
household survey in the world. The study started in 1968 collecting information on a 
nationally representative sample of over 18,000 individuals from almost 5,000 
households in the United States. And it continued by following each individual 
continually in successive years until 1997 and in every two years since 1997. The PSID 
collects information on these individuals and their descendants regarding employment, 
income, expenditures, health, marriage, childbearing, child development, education and a 
lot of other topics such as wealth, pensions, and housing characteristics.
2
 This dissertation 
uses the 36 waves (for the years 1975-2010)
3
 of the PSID for the reason that there is only 
full information on the amount of incentive pay workers received in their jobs since 
                                                 
2
  Source: https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/Brochures/PSID.pdf.  
3
  In the PSID, data on income from bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime during 
year t are asked in interview year t+1. Thus, this dissertation actually uses data covering 
interview years 1976-2011. 
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1975.
4
 For this analysis, the sample consists of only household heads between the ages of 
18 and 65 for the years 1975-2010.
5
 
 
4.1.2 Measurements of Variables using the PSID  
The analysis conducts the key variables including the dependent variables and 
family characteristics from the PSID as follows:  
Identifying Worker’s Reactions to Compensation Incentives: The Presence of 
Incentive Pay and The Amount of Incentive Pay.  
First, the presence of incentive pay is constructed as an incentive pay indicator 
variable. The incentive pay indicator variable is created by looking at whether the 
household head receives income from bonuses, commissions, tips, or overtime pay in the 
job. The amounts of bonuses, commissions, and tips vary by workers’ discretionary 
effort. Thus, this is a decent measure of incentive pay for the reason that bonuses, 
commissions, and tips provide incentives for workers to exert more effort.
6
 This variable 
is mainly determined from the question “Did you/HEAD have any income from bonuses, 
                                                 
4
  In the PSID, there is no question about the amount of income derived from the 
incentive pay heads received in interview year 1968 and 1969. From interview year 1970 
through 1975, the questions were asked about the bracketed amount of head’s income 
from the incentive pay including bonuses, commissions and overtime for the previous 
calendar year. Therefore, there is only full information on the amount of incentive pay 
heads received for the previous calendar year since interview year 1976.   
5
  This dissertation focuses on heads of households stems from the fact that only heads 
are asked about their income derived from the incentive pay, such as bonuses, 
commission, tips, and overtime in the PSID. Within each wave of the PSID data, each 
family unit has one and only one current household head. The household head may 
change over time if other changes affect the family.  
6
  It is not ideal that overtime pay is included in the incentive pay measure, but that’s how 
the question is worded in the PSID. 
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overtime, tips, or commissions in (previous calendar year)?” 7  The two categories of 
responses: Yes or No are used to determine whether the incentive pay presents in the job 
for each year. Individuals who didn’t report or respond this information are excluded 
from the analysis.  
Second, the worker’s effort supply is measured as the amount of incentive pay 
including bonuses, commission, tips, and overtime pay the heads received from 1975 
through 2010.
8
 The analysis deflates nominal values of the amount of incentive pay to 
real values for each year. The formula for obtaining a series of real values of the amount 
of incentive pay is given by dividing nominal values by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
for that same year is: 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑃𝑎𝑦 =
𝑁𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝐶𝑃𝐼/100
.
9
 
                                                 
7
  In the PSID, for interview years 1976-1992, individuals were asked the amount of 
income they received from bonuses, commissions, and/or working overtime over the 
previous calendar year. The question was “Head’s income from bonuses, overtime, 
and/or commissions in (previous calendar year)”. Individuals are classified as having had 
an incentive pay if they reported non-zero amount of this income. Otherwise, the 
individuals are coded as not receiving the incentive pay in their job. In the interview year 
1993, there were separate questions about the amounts of income earned from bonuses, 
tips, commissions, and overtime in 1992. Individuals are classified as receiving the 
incentive pay if they reported non-zero amount of either type of income. Otherwise, the 
individuals were coded as not receiving the incentive pay. Starting with interview year 
1994, the question “Did you/HEAD have any income from bonuses, overtime, tips, or 
commissions in (previous calendar year)?” was asked directly. So this dissertation uses 
the answer to this question as the measure of the presence of incentive pay. 
8
  For interview years 1976-1992, the analysis directly uses “Head’s income from 
bonuses, overtime, and/or commissions in (previous calendar year)” as the amount of 
incentive pay received in the job. Starting with the interview year 1993, there are separate 
questions about the amounts earned from bonuses, tips, commissions, and overtime for 
the previous calendar year. For the sake of comparability with the pre-1993 years, adding 
reported amounts of income from bonuses, tips, commissions, and overtime together 
generates the aggregate amount of incentive pay. In this way, the analysis is able to have 
the amount of aggregate incentive pay received in the job for each year of the survey. 
9
  The Consumer Price Index data is in Appendix Table 1. Base year is chained; 1982-
1984 = 100.  
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Then the analysis uses the logarithm of real value of the amount of incentive pay received 
in the job. Moreover, the worker’s reactions to different types of incentives are measured 
as the amount of bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime from those separate questions 
for years from 1992 to 2010. The reason of using data from this time period is that there 
are separate questions about the amounts earned in bonuses, tips, commissions, and 
overtime for the previous calendar year in the PSID only starting with the interview year 
1993. The analysis uses the logarithm of real values of the amount of different types of 
incentives separately. Therefore, the individuals who reported zero amount of incentive 
pay are not included in the analysis in terms of the effects on worker’s effort supply, but 
they are included in the analysis in terms of the effects on worker’s job choices based on 
incentives.  
Measurements of Family Characteristics. In the PSID, family characteristics 
including the employment status of spouse, the number of children, the ages of children, 
and the presence of alternative family income sources are available.   
Specifically, the employment status of spouse is accessed by the question “We 
would like to know about what WIFE/ ‘WIFE’ is working now, looking for work, retired, 
keeping house, a student, or what?” The workers are categorized into three groups as: no 
spouse, having a working spouse and having a not-working spouse based on their 
responses. The number of children refers to “number of persons now in the Family Unit 
under 18 years of age”. For the ages of children, four indicator variables are created to 
represent the presence of child between the ages of zero and five, between the ages of six 
and eleven, between the ages of twelve and seventeen, and age 18 and above living in the 
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family unit, separately.
10
 The presence of alternative family income sources is measured 
by the indicator for the presence of other income receiver in the family unit.
11
  
Control Variables. The analysis controls for gender, education measured as the 
highest grade level completed, potential labor market experience
12
 and its square, union 
member status, race, industry, occupation, state, and year in the regressions. Specifically, 
union member status is accessed by the question “Do you belong to that labor union?—
Current main job”. The two categories of responses: Yes or No are used to determine 
whether the worker belongs to a labor union in the job. Race is categorized into eight 
groups as: White, Black or African-American, American Indian or Alaska Native (native 
American), Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, Latino, Race other than black 
or white, Other, and two or more races mentioned. Industry includes thirteen categories: 
not working, Agriculture or Forestry or Fishing, Mining, Constructing, Manufacturing, 
Transportation or Communications or other Public Utilities, Wholesale and Retail Trade, 
Finance or Insurance or Real Estate, Business and Repair Services, Personal Service, 
Entertainment and Recreation Services, Professional and Related Service, and Public 
Administration. Occupation includes ten categories: not working, Professional or 
Technical or Kindred workers, Managers and Administrators (except Farm), Sales 
                                                 
10
  To construct these four indicators for the presence of child at different ages in the 
family unit, this dissertation utilizes information on the age of youngest child from the 
question “Age of youngest person now in the family unit under 18 years of age” and the 
age of the head’s own child calculated using the responses of the question “What is full 
birthdate (i.e., year, month, day) of each child listed?” 
11
  In the PSID, data on the presence of other income receiver in the family unit during 
year t are asked in interview year t+1.  
12
  The potential labor market experience is defined as age minus education minus 6. The 
analysis excludes observations having negative potential experience from the sample.  
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Workers, Clerical and Kindred Workers, Craftsman and Kindred Workers, Operatives, 
Laborers (except Farm), Farmers and Farm Managers, and Service Workers. State refers 
to the respondent’s state of residence and year refers to the calendar year 1975-2010. 
 
4.1.3 Summary Statistics of the PSID Sample 
4.1.3.1 Summary Statistics of the 1975-2010 PSID Full Sample 
Restricting the sample to observations that have incentive pay in the job, the 
employment status of spouse, the number of children, the ages of children, the presence 
of alternative family income sources and control variables leaves a total sample of 
125,117 observations for 16,426 workers from 1975 through 2010. The variable 
definitions and summary statistics of the variables for the 1975-2010 PSID full sample 
used in the analysis are presented in Table 4-1.  
Table 4-1 shows that 9% of the sample reported information of receiving 
incentive pay including bonuses, commissions, tips, and/or working overtime in their 
jobs. Among the 11,253 observations (i.e., 5,490 workers), who received non-zero 
incentive compensation, the average of real values of the amount of incentive pay is 
$4,572 per year. The descriptive statistics of the dependent variables—the presence of 
incentive pay and the amount of the incentive received in the job—provide evidence that 
there is variation in terms of workers’ job choices based on incentives and effort supply.  
The summary statistics also show that there is variation among family 
characteristics and control variables in the PSID sample. Nearly 25% of the sample is 
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female.
13
 About 60% of the sample is White and 35% is Black or African-American. 
Approximately 40% of workers don’t have a spouse, and about 36% of them have a 
working spouse. The average number of children in the family unit is 1.10 with a 
standard deviation of 1.29. About 31% of all observations in the sample have a child aged 
between zero and five, 29% of them have a child between the ages of six and eleven, and 
over 25% of the sample has a child aged between twelve and seventeen living in the 
family unit. The mean of the highest completed education level is about grade 13. 
Approximately 16% of the sample observations are union members. The average 
potential labor market experience is about 21 years. In the sample, 20.7% of the 
observations are not working for money. In terms of occupation, 14%, 13.4%, 13.1%, 
10.9%, 10.2%, 7.5%, 4.4%, 3.9%, and 1.9% of the sample are in the categories of 
Craftsman and Kindred Workers, Professional or Technical or Kindred Workers, 
Operatives, Managers and Administrators (except Farm), Service Workers, Clerical and 
Kindred Workers, Laborers (except Farm), Sales Workers, and Farmers and Farm 
Managers, respectively. In terms of industry, Professional and Related Services, 
Manufacturing, Wholesale and Retail Trade, Transportation or Communications or Other 
Public Utilities, and Construction are the top 5 industries, which have highest percentage 
of sample observations.  
 
                                                 
13
  This small proportion of female observations in the 1975-2010 PSID sample is 
consistent with the fact that the sample of female heads is relatively small in the PSID. 
When the PSID began, the husband was arbitrarily designated the head if the family 
contained a husband-wife pair. The same is true if the female has a boyfriend with whom 
she has been living for at least one year.    
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Table 4-1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics for the 1975-2010 Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics Sample  
(N=125,117) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
The presence of incentive pay Indicator of the worker’s job choice 
based on the presence of incentive 
pay, which equals one if 
respondent reported having income 
from bonuses, commissions, tips, 
and/or working overtime in 
previous calendar year.  
0.091 0.288 
The nominal value of the 
amount of incentive pay 
The reported annual amount of 
incentive pay for the respondent 
who received non-zero income 
from bonuses, commissions, tips, 
and/or working overtime in 
previous calendar year. Measured 
in dollars.  
5901.882 27486.539 
The real value of the amount of 
incentive pay  
The real value of the amount of non-
zero incentive pay for the 
respondent received deflated from 
the nominal value of the amount of 
incentive pay in dollars. 
4571.951 18061.958 
Log of amount of incentive pay Log of real value of the amount of 
non-zero incentive pay the 
respondent received. 
6.794 1.784 
Spouse employment status: no 
spouse 
Indicator variable of spouse 
employment status, which equals 
one if the respondent didn’t have a 
spouse. 
0.404 0.491 
Spouse employment status: 
working spouse 
Indicator variable of spouse 
employment status, which equals 
one if the respondent had a 
working spouse. 
0.359 0.480 
Spouse employment status: not 
working spouse 
Indicator variable of spouse 
employment status, which equals 
one if the respondent had a not 
working spouse.  
0.209 0.406 
Number of children The number of children living in the 
family unit under 18 years of age.  
1.096 1.289 
The presence of child age 0-5  Indicator variable of the presence of 
child’s age, which equals one if 
there is child between ages of zero 
and five living in the family unit.  
0.309 0.462 
The presence of child age 6-11  Indicator variable of the presence of 
child’s age, which equals one if 
there is child between ages of six 
and eleven living in the family unit. 
0.285 0.452 
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Table 4-1 (Continued) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
The presence of child age 12-
17  
Indicator variable of the presence of 
child’s age, which equals one if 
there is child between twelve and 
seventeen living in the family unit. 
0.254 0.435 
The presence of child age>=18  Indicator variable of the presence of 
child’s age, which equals one if 
there is child aged eighteen and 
above living in the family unit. 
0.384 0.486 
The presence of alternative 
family income sources 
 
Indictor variable of the presence of 
alternative family income sources, 
which equals one if there is other 
income receive in the family unit. 
0.245 0.430 
Female Indicator variable of gender, which 
equals one if the respondent was 
female. 
0.253 0.435 
Potential labor market 
experience 
Potential labor market experience in 
years. 
20.503 12.646 
Education The highest completed education level 
in grades.  
12.660 2.974 
Union member  Indicator variable of union member 
status, which equals one if 
respondent belonged to a labor 
union in the job.  
0.160 0.367 
White Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is white. 
0.599 0.490 
Black Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is black or 
African-American. 
0.352 0.478 
American Indian or Alaska 
Native 
Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is 
American Indian or Alaska Native 
(native American). 
0.022 0.146 
Asian or Native Hawaiian or 
Pacific Islander 
Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is Asian or 
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander. 
0.003 0.055 
Latino Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is Latino. 
0.009 0.094 
Race other than Black or 
White 
Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is race 
other than black or white. 
0.001 0.034 
Other Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is another 
race. 
0.008 0.087 
Two or more races mentioned Indicator variable of race, which 
equals one if respondent is 
mentioned with two or more races. 
0.011 0.106 
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Table 4-1 (Continued) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Occupation: not working Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent is 
not working for money. 
0.207 0.405 
Occupation: Professional, 
Technical or Kindred 
Workers 
Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Professional, 
Technical, and Kindred Workers. 
0.134 0.340 
Occupation: Managers and 
Administrators (except 
Farm) 
Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Managers and 
Administrators, except Farm. 
0.109 0.312 
Occupation: Sales Workers Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Sales Workers. 
0.039 0.193 
Occupation: Clerical and 
Kindred Workers 
Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Clerical and Kindred 
Workers. 
0.075 0.263 
Occupation: Craftsman and 
Kindred Workers 
Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Craftsman and 
Kindred Workers. 
0.140 0.347 
Occupation: Operatives  Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Operatives. 
0.131 0.338 
Occupation: Laborers (except 
Farm) 
Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Laborers, except 
Farm.  
0.044 0.205 
Occupation: Farmers and Farm 
Managers 
Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Farmers and Farm 
Managers.  
0.019 0.136 
Occupation: Service Workers Indicator variable of occupation, 
which equals one if respondent’s 
occupation is Service Workers. 
0.102 0.302 
Industry: not working Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent is not 
working for money. 
0.207 0.405 
Industry: Agriculture, Forestry, 
or Fisheries 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Agriculture, Forestry, and 
Fisheries. 
0.027 0.163 
Industry: Mining Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Mining. 
0.007 0.081 
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Table 4-1 (Continued) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Industry: Construction Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Construction. 
0.070 0.255 
Industry: Manufacturing Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Manufacturing. 
0.181 0.385 
Industry: Transportation, 
Communications, and Other 
Public Utilities 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Transportation, Communications, 
and Other Public Utilities. 
0.071 0.257 
Industry: Wholesale and Retail 
Trade 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Wholesale and Retail Trade. 
0.122 0.328 
Industry: Finance, Insurance, 
and Real Estate 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Finance, Insurance, and Real 
Estate. 
0.036 0.186 
Industry: Business and Repair 
Services 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Business and Repair Services. 
0.038 0.192 
Industry: Personal Services Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Personal Services. 
0.028 0.166 
Industry: Entertainment and 
Recreation Services 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Entertainment and Recreation 
Services. 
0.007 0.084 
Industry: Professional and 
Related Services 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Professional and Related 
Services. 
0.200 0.400 
Industry: Public 
Administration 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry 
is Public Administration. 
0.061 0.240 
 
4.1.3.2 Summary Statistics of the 1992-2010 PSID Sub-Samples 
It would be ideal to differentiate different types of incentives such as bonuses, 
commissions and tips and to use them separately in the analysis. But those separate 
questions about the amounts earned in bonuses, commissions and tips for the previous 
calendar year are not available until the interview year 1993 in the PSID. Thus, the 
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analysis has four sub-samples in terms of non-zero annual amount of bonuses, tips, 
commissions, and overtime pay the respondent received in the job from 1992 to 2010 to 
test workers’ reactions to different types of incentives, but it is not the main analysis of 
this dissertation. This section presents summary statistics of key variables for these four 
sub-samples in Table 4-2, 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5.
14
 
First, as presented in Table 4-2, restricting the 1992-2010 PSID sample to 
individual with positive annual dollar amounts of bonuses the respondent received in 
previous calendar year leaves a total sample of 2,794 observations for 1,826 workers. 
Table 4-2 shows that the average of real values of the amount of bonuses is $4,798 per 
year with a very large standard deviation, among the people who received non-zero 
bonuses. In this sub-sample, nearly 23% is female, which is similar to the proportion of 
the 1975-2010 PSID full sample. Approximately 37% of workers don’t have a spouse, 
and about 39% of them have a working spouse. The average number of children in the 
family unit is 0.97 with a standard deviation of 1.15. About 25% of the 2,794 
observations in the sub-sample have a child aged between zero and five, 28% of them 
have a child between the ages of six and eleven, and over 26% of the sample has a child 
aged between twelve and seventeen living in the family unit. The mean of the highest 
grade completed is 14. Approximately 7.8% of the sub-sample observations are union 
members, which are fewer than that of the 1975-2010 full sample. The average potential 
labor market experience is about 20 years.  
 
                                                 
14
  The variables of race, industry, and occupation are presented in Appendix Tables 2, 3, 
4, and 5.  
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Table 4-2: Summary Statistics for the 1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero 
Income from Bonuses 
 (N=2,794) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
The nominal value of the amount of bonuses 8098.987 40650.638 
The real value of the amount of bonuses 4798.283 23565.171 
Log of amount of bonuses 6.626 1.777 
Spouse employment status: no spouse 0.370 0.483 
Spouse employment status: working spouse 0.385 0.487 
Spouse employment status: not working spouse 0.149 0.356 
Number of children 0.967 1.148 
The presence of child age 0-5  0.254 0.435 
The presence of child age 6-11  0.281 0.450 
The presence of child age 7-12 0.266 0.442 
The presence of child age>=18  0.417 0.493 
The presence of alternative family income sources 0.231 0.422 
Female 0.228 0.420 
Potential labor market experience 19.730 10.412 
Education 13.738 2.634 
Union member  0.078 0.268 
 
Second, as presented in Table 4-3, restricting the 1992-2010 PSID sample to 
individuals with positive annual dollar amounts of non-zero commissions the respondent 
received in previous calendar year leaves a total sample of 270 observations for 220 
workers. Table 4-3 shows that the average of real values of the amount of commissions is 
$19,139 per year with a very large standard deviation, among the people who received 
non-zero commissions. In this sub-sample, nearly 14% is female, which is smaller than 
the proportion of the 1975-2010 PSID full sample. Approximately 33% of workers don’t 
have a spouse, and about 40% of them have a working spouse. The average number of 
children in the family unit is 1.10 with a standard deviation of 1.29. About 28% of the 
270 observations in the sub-sample have a child aged between zero and five, 25% of 
them have a child between the ages of six and eleven, and over 20% of the sample has a 
child aged between twelve and seventeen living in the family unit. The mean of the 
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highest grade completed is 14. Approximately 2.2% of the sub-sample observations are 
union members, which are fewer than that of the full sample. The average potential labor 
market experience is about 21 years. 
 
Table 4-3: Summary Statistics for the 1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero 
Income from Commissions 
 (N=270) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
The nominal value of the amount of bonuses 30443.752 81171.054 
The real value of the amount of bonuses 19138.956 547.259 
Log of amount of bonuses 8.435 2.084 
Spouse employment status: no spouse 0.330 0.471 
Spouse employment status: working spouse 0.404 0.492 
Spouse employment status: not working spouse 0.159 0.367 
Number of children 1.096 1.289 
The presence of child age 0-5  0.278 0.449 
The presence of child age 6-11  0.248 0.433 
The presence of child age 7-12 0.196 0.398 
The presence of child age>=18  0.493 0.501 
The presence of alternative family income sources 0.274 0.447 
Female 0.141 0.348 
Potential labor market experience 21.163 11.146 
Education 14.126 2.150 
Union member  0.022 0.148 
 
Third, as presented in Table 4-4, restricting the 1992-2010 PSID sample to 
individuals with positive annual dollar amounts of non-zero tips the respondent received 
in previous calendar year leaves a total sample of 237 observations for 186 workers. 
Table 4-4 shows that the average of real values of the amount of tips is $4,855 per year 
among the people who received non-zero tips. In this sub-sample, nearly 46% is female, 
which is larger than the proportion of the 1975-2010 PSID full sample. Approximately 
72% of workers don’t have a spouse, and about 16% of them have a working spouse. The 
average number of children in the family unit is 0.81 with a standard deviation of 1.12. 
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About 31% of the 237 observations in the sub-sample have a child aged between zero and 
five, 25% of them have a child between the ages of six and eleven, and over 23% of the 
sample has a child aged between twelve and seventeen living in the family unit. The 
mean of the highest completed education level is grade 13. Approximately 6.8% of the 
sub-sample observations are union members, which are fewer than that of the 1975-2010 
PSID full sample. The average potential labor market experience is about 13 years, which 
is fewer than that of the full sample.  
 
Table 4-4: Summary Statistics for the 1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero 
Income from Tips 
 (N=237) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
The nominal value of the amount of bonuses 7370.350 64955.391 
The real value of the amount of bonuses 4854.960 43821.549 
Log of amount of bonuses 6.365 1.907 
Spouse employment status: no spouse 0.717 0.451 
Spouse employment status: working spouse 0.160 0.368 
Spouse employment status: not working spouse 0.072 0.259 
Number of children 0.810 1.117 
The presence of child age 0-5  0.312 0.464 
The presence of child age 6-11  0.245 0.431 
The presence of child age 7-12 0.232 0.423 
The presence of child age>=18  0.439 0.497 
The presence of alternative family income sources 0.177 0.383 
Female 0.456 0.499 
Potential labor market experience 13.380 9.243 
Education 12.578 1.792 
Union member  0.068 0.251 
 
Fourth, as presented in Table 4-5, restricting the 1992-2010 PSID sample to 
individuals with positive annual dollar amounts of non-zero overtime pay the respondent 
received in previous calendar year leaves a total sample of 1,121 observations for 915 
workers. Table 4-5 shows that the average of real values of the amount of overtime pay is 
  52 
$1,987 per year with a very large standard deviation, among the people who received 
non-zero overtime pay. In this sub-sample, nearly 28% is female. Approximately 46% of 
workers don’t have a spouse, and about 33% of them have a working spouse. The 
average number of children in the family unit is 1.03 with a standard deviation of 1.20. 
About 28% of the 1,121 observations in the sub-sample have a child aged between zero 
and five, 31% of them have a child between the ages of six and eleven, and over 26% of 
the sample has a child aged between twelve and seventeen living in the family unit. The 
mean of the highest grade completed is 13. Approximately 28.9% of the sub-sample 
observations are union members. The average potential labor market experience is about 
18 years. 
 
Table 4-5: Summary Statistics for the 1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero 
Income from Overtime Pay 
 (N=1,121) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
The nominal value of the amount of bonuses 3220.358 5427.844 
The real value of the amount of bonuses 1987.294 3246.092 
Log of amount of bonuses 6.612 1.571 
Spouse employment status: no spouse 0.459 0.498 
Spouse employment status: working spouse 0.331 0.471 
Spouse employment status: not working spouse 0.133 0.340 
Number of children 1.029 1.201 
The presence of child age 0-5  0.275 0.447 
The presence of child age 6-11  0.309 0.462 
The presence of child age 7-12 0.256 0.437 
The presence of child age>=18  0.395 0.489 
The presence of alternative family income sources 0.222 0.416 
Female 0.276 0.447 
Potential labor market experience 18.047 10.354 
Education 12.919 2.210 
Union member  0.289 0.454 
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4.2 The American Time Use Survey (2003-2012) 
4.2.1 Brief Introduction to the ATUS 
The American Time Use Survey (ATUS) is an ongoing survey on time use to 
measure how people spend their time among activities and the study began in 2003 in the 
U.S. The individuals in the ATUS are randomly selected from households that are 
completing their participation in the Current Population Survey (CPS).
15
 The ATUS 
interviews are conducted between two and five months after the last CPS interview for 
the ATUS household.
16
 The ATUS interviews are administered using computer-assisted 
telephone, either in English or in Spanish (see Hamermesh et al. 2005 for a description 
the ATUS study and interview process). The ATUS respondents provide detailed 
information on how, where, and with whom they spend their time during a designated 24-
hour period from 4 a.m. on the designated day to 4 a.m. on the following day (the 
interview day). This unique feature of the ATUS data provides the opportunity to explore 
the effects of the time constraints on work in this dissertation. Since the ATUS uses the 
CPS as a sampling frame, The ATUS also includes the usual labor market and 
demographic information as the CPS.  
In 2003, the ATUS started collecting 20,720 usable time diaries, or over 1,700 
diaries per month (Hamermesh et al. 2005). But beginning in January 2004, the sample 
                                                 
15
  Households that have completed their final (8th) month of the CPS are eligible for the 
ATUS. One person aged 15 or over is randomly chosen from each household, which is 
selected from the eligible group to represent a range of demographic characteristics, to 
answer questions about his or her time use. All adults within a household have the same 
probability of being selected. This person is interviewed for the ATUS 2-5 months after 
his or her household’s final CPS interview. Source: 
http://www.bls.gov/tus/atusfaqs.htm#4. 
16
  Source: https://www.atusdata.org/atus/whatisatus.shtml.  
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size was reduced to about 14,000 or about 1,150 diaries per month, and it has remained 
near that level since 2004.
17
 Thus, the data has been collected from over 136,000 
interviews conducted from 2003 to 2012. For this analysis, the sample only consists of 
respondents aged from 18 to 65 for the years 2003 through 2012.  
 
4.2.2 Measurement of Variables using the ATUS 
The key variables including the dependent variables and family characteristics 
from the ATUS are constructed as follows:  
Identifying Worker’s Reactions to Compensation Incentives: The Presence of 
Incentive Pay and The Amount of Incentive Pay.  
First, similar to using the PSID data, the presence of incentive pay in the ATUS is 
also constructed as an incentive pay indicator variable. The incentive pay indicator 
variable is created by looking at whether the individual receives commissions, tips, or 
overtime in the job. This variable is determined from the question “Do you usually 
receive overtime pay, tips, or commissions [at your main job]?” The two categories of 
responses, Yes of No, are used to identify the presence of incentive pay in the job. This 
question was asked for employed ATUS respondents, excluding those who were self-
employed or working without pay. Note that one key difference between the incentive 
pay in the ATUS and the one in the PSID is that bonuses are not included as part of 
incentive pay in the ATUS, due to the wording of the questionnaire in the ATUS. 
                                                 
17
  Source: https://www.atusdata.org/atus/linked_docs/atususersguide.pdf.  
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Second, also similar to the PSID data, the worker’s effort supply is measured as 
the amount of incentive pay including overtime pay, tips, and commissions workers 
received in their job from 2003 to 2010. The variable is assessed from the question “How 
much do you usually receive JUST in overtime pay, tips or commissions, before taxes or 
other deductions?” This question was asked for employed ATUS respondents who report 
hourly earnings and who report usually receiving overtime pay, tips, or commissions. The 
response is measured in weekly dollar amount
 
 top-coded at $2,884.61. The analysis 
deflates nominal values of the amount of incentive pay to real values for each year by 
dividing nominal values by the CPI for that same year. Then the analysis uses the 
logarithm of real value of the amount of weekly incentive pay received in the job, which 
excludes the individuals who reported zero amount of incentive in the analysis on the 
effects of worker’s effort supply. But these individuals are still included in the analysis of 
worker’s job choices based on incentives.  
Measurements of Family characteristics. In the ATUS, family characteristics 
include spouse employment status, the number of children and the ages of children. Note 
that one difference from using the PSID data is that the presence of alternative family 
income sources is not available in the ATUS sample.  
Specifically, the employment status of spouse is determined from the responses of 
whether the respondent’s spouse or unmarried partner is employed. The workers are 
categorized into three groups as: no spouse if the response is “Not in universe”, having an 
employed spouse if the response is employed, and having a not-employed spouse if the 
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response is not employed.
18
 The number of children is measured as the number of the 
respondent’s own children under the age of 18 who live in the household.19 Individuals 
who have own children under 18 but not living in the household are excluded from the 
sample. For the ages of children, six indicators are created to represent the presence of an 
individual’s own child under the age of one, between the ages of one and two, between 
the ages of three and five, between the ages of six and twelve, between the ages of 
thirteen and seventeen, and no own child under the age of 18 living in the household, 
separately.  
Measuring Time Constraints on Work.  Using detailed information of time spent 
on individual’s activities in ATUS, this analysis uses two ways to measure the time 
constraints on work. The underlying assumption is that the more time the individual 
spends on non-work activities, the more time constraints on work she or he has. The time 
spent on each activity is measured in minutes in the ATUS. This analysis rescales these 
time variables by dividing the original amount of time by 100.  
The first way is to generate an aggregate time constraints on work variable to 
capture the total time influences of other non-work activities. The variable is created as 
the aggregate time spent on activities of household, caring for and helping household and 
non-household members, socializing, relaxing, and leisure, and sports, exercise, and 
recreation in the 24-hour period starting at 4 a.m. the preceding day.  
                                                 
18
  “Universe” here is defined as ATUS respondents with a spouse or unmarried partner 
in the household. 
19
  In the ATUS, own children refer to the respondent’s own children, whether they live 
in the respondent’s household or in another household. Stepchildren and adopted children 
are considered own children, although foster children are not. Source: 
http://www.bls.gov/tus/atususersguide.pdf.  
  57 
The second way is to construct separate time constraints on work variables in 
order to explore the time influences of different types of activities. This analysis 
constructs three separate time constraints variables by adding each group of similar 
activities together: time spent on household activities, aggregate time spent on caring for 
and helping household and non-household members, and aggregate time spent on 
socializing, relaxing, leisure, sports, exercise, and recreation activities.  
Control Variables. The analysis controls for gender, education measured as 
completed education years, potential labor market experience
20
 and its square, union 
member status, metropolitan area, race, industry, occupation, current state, and year in the 
regressions. Specifically, union member status indicates whether or not the individual 
belonged to a union. The metropolitan area variable indicates whether a household 
locates in a metropolitan area or not. Race is categorized into five groups: White only, 
Black only, American Indian or Alaskan Native, Asian only or Hawaiian Pacific Islander 
only, and Two or more races. Industry includes twenty one categories: not working, 
Agriculture or Forestry or Fishing or Hunting, Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, 
Wholesale Trade, Retail Trade, Transportation and Warehousing, Utilities, Information, 
Finance and Insurance, Real Estate and Rental and Leasing, Professional or Scientific or 
Technical Services, Management or Administrative or Waste Management Services, 
Educational Services, Health Care and Social Services, Arts or Entertainment or 
Recreation, Accommodation and Food Services, Other Services, and Public 
Administration. Occupation includes ten categories: not working, Management or 
                                                 
20
  As in the PSID, the analysis excludes observations had negative potential experience 
from the ATUS sample.  
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Business or Financial occupations, Professional and Related occupations, Service 
occupations, Sales and Related occupations, Office and Administrative Support 
occupations, Farming or Fishing or Forestry occupations, Construction and Extraction 
occupations, Installation or Maintenance or Repair occupations, Production occupations, 
and Transportation and Material Moving occupations. Current state refers to the 
household’s state of residence and year refers to the calendar year from 2003 to 2012.  
 
4.2.3 Summary Statistics of the ATUS Sample 
The restricted sample with the presence of incentive pay, the employment status 
of spouse, the number of children, the age of child, and control variables has 54,612 
observations. In order to present the nature of the ATUS sample used in the analysis, the 
unweighted summary statistics and variable definitions for the 2003-2012 ATUS sample 
are shown in Table 4-6. All regression estimates using the ATUS data reported in the 
next section of the paper are weighted using the ATUS sample weights. 
Table 4-6 shows that in the ATUS sample, 17.7% of the observations reported 
they usually received overtime pay, tips, or commissions at their job. Among 3,524 
observations who received non-zero amount of compensation incentives in their job, the 
average of real values of the weekly incentive pay is $91. The descriptive statistics of the 
dependent variables—the presence of incentive pay and the amount of the incentive 
received in the job—consistently provide evidence that there are a lot of variation in 
terms of workers’ job choices based on incentives and effort supply.  
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The summary statistics also show that there is variation among family 
characteristics and control variables in the sample. Compared with the PSID sample, the 
ATUS sample has relative more female observations. About 53% of the ATUS sample is 
female. About 83% of the sample is White and 12% is Black. Approximately 48% of the 
sample has a working spouse and nearly 38% of the workers don’t have a spouse. The 
mean value of the number of own children under age 18 living in the household is 0.91. 
About 4% of all observations in the sample have children under the age of one, 9% of 
them have children aged between one and two, 14% of them have children aged between 
three and five, nearly 28% of the sample has children between the ages of six and twelve, 
and 18% of them have children aged between thirteen and seventeen. The average 
completed education years is nearly 14 years and the average potential labor market 
experience is 21 years. 14% of the workers belong to unions and about 83% of the 
sample lives in a metropolitan area. In terms of occupation, Professional and Related 
occupations, Management or Business or Financial occupations, Office and 
Administrative Support occupations, Service occupations, and Sales and Related 
occupations are the top 5 occupations that have highest percentage of the sample. In 
terms of industry, Health Care and Social Services, Manufacturing, Education Services, 
Retail Trade, Professional or Scientific or Technical Services and Public Administration 
are the top 6 industries that have highest percentage of sample observations. 
In terms of time spent on different activities, individuals spent about 407 minutes 
on average on household, caring for other people, socializing, and sports activities in the 
24-hour period. Individuals daily spent about 109 minutes, 44 minutes, and 253 minutes 
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on average on household activities, on caring for and helping household and non-
household members activities, and on both socializing and sports activities, respectively.  
 
Table 4-6: Variable Definitions and Unweighted Summary Statistics for the 2003-
2012 American Time Use Survey Sample 
(N=54,612) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
The presence of incentive pay Indicator of the worker’s job choice 
based on the presence of incentive 
pay, which equals one if respondent 
receives overtime pay, tips, or 
commissions at the main job. 
0.177 0.382 
The nominal value of the 
amount of incentive pay 
The reported weekly amount of 
incentive pay for the respondent who 
received non-zero income from 
overtime pay, tips, or commissions at 
the main job. Measured in dollars. 
181.623 206.288 
The real value of the amount 
of incentive pay 
The real value of the weekly amount of 
non-zero incentive pay in dollars.  
90.605 102.695 
Log of amount of incentive 
pay 
Log of real value of the weekly amount 
of non-zero incentive pay the 
respondent received. 
3.979 1.157 
Spouse employment status: 
no spouse 
Indicator variable of spouse 
employment status, which equals one 
if the respondent didn’t have a 
spouse. 
0.381 0.486 
Spouse employment status: 
working spouse 
Indicator variable of spouse 
employment status, which equals one 
if the respondent had an employed 
spouse. 
0.478 0.500 
Spouse employment status: 
not working spouse 
Indicator variable of spouse 
employment status, which equals one 
if the respondent had a not employed 
spouse.  
0.141 0.348 
Number of own children The number of own children under the 
age of 18 living in the household. 
0.908 1.097 
The presence of own child 
age <1 
Indicator variable of the presence of 
own child’s age, which equals one if 
there is own child aged under one 
living in the household. 
0.041 0.198 
The presence of own child 
age 1-2 
Indicator variable of the presence of 
own child’s age, which equals one if 
there is own child aged between one 
and two living in the household. 
0.093 0.290 
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Table 4-6 (Continued)    
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
The presence of own child 
age 3-5 
 
 
Indicator variable of the presence of 
own child’s age, which equals one if 
there is own child aged between three 
and five living in the household. 
0.139 0.346 
The presence of own child 
age 6-12 
Indicator variable of the presence of 
own child’s age, which equals one if 
there is own child aged between six 
and twelve living in the household. 
0.278 0.448 
The presence of own child 
age 13-17 
Indicator variable of the presence of 
own child’s age, which equals one if 
there is own child aged between 
thirteen and seventeen living in the 
household. 
0.181 0.385 
The presence of no own child 
age <18 
Indicator variable of the presence of 
own child’s age, which equals one if 
there is no own child under age of 18 
living in the household. 
0.500 0.500 
Aggregate time constraints on 
work 
Time spent on household, caring for 
household and non-household 
members, socializing, relaxing, 
leisure, sports, exercise, and 
recreation activities in minutes. 
407.163 224.361 
Time spent on household 
activities 
Time spent on household activities in 
minutes. 
109.443 132.284 
Aggregate time spent on 
caring for people 
Time spent on caring for household and 
non-household members activities in 
minutes. 
44.900 88.657 
Aggregate time spent on 
social activities 
Time spent on socializing, relaxing, 
leisure, sports, exercise, and 
recreation activities in minutes. 
252.820 182.478 
Female Indicator variable of gender, which 
equals one if the respondent was 
female. 
0.530 0.499 
Potential labor market 
experience 
Potential labor market experience in 
years. 
21.284 11.481 
Education Completed education in years. 14.191 2.899 
Union member  Indicator variable of union member 
status, which equals one if the 
respondent belonged to a union. 
0.140 0.347 
Metropolitan Indicator variable which equals one if a 
household was located in a 
metropolitan area. 
0.832 0.373 
White Indicator variable of race, which equals 
one if respondent is White. 
0.827 0.378 
Black Indicator variable of race, which equals 
one if respondent is Black. 
0.118 0.323 
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Table 4-6 (Continued)    
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
American Indian or Alaska 
Native 
Indicator variable of race, which equals 
one if respondent is American Indian 
or Alaska Native. 
0.006 0.080 
Asian or Pacific Islander Indicator variable of race, which equals 
one if respondent is Asian or Pacific 
Islander. 
0.036 0.187 
Two or more races Indicator variable of race, which equals 
one if respondent is reported with two 
or more races. 
0.012 0.110 
Occupation: not working Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent is not 
working. 
0.000 0.000 
Occupation: Management, 
Business, or Financial 
occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Management or Business or 
Financial occupations. 
0.164 0.370 
Occupation: Professional and 
Related occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Professional and Related 
occupations. 
0.262 0.440 
Occupation: Service 
occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Service occupations. 
0.136 0.343 
Occupation: Sales and 
Related occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Sales and Related occupations. 
0.093 0.290 
Occupation: Office and 
Administrative Support  
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Office and Administrative Support 
occupations. 
0.149 0.357 
Occupation: Farming, 
Fishing, or Forestry 
occupations 
  Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Farming or Fishing or Forestry 
occupations.  
0.006 0.078 
Occupation: Construction and 
Extraction occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Construction and Extraction 
occupations. 
0.039 0.194 
Occupation: Installation, 
Maintenance, or Repair 
occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Installation or Maintenance or 
Repair occupations. 
0.035 0.183 
Occupation: Production  
 
 
 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Production occupations. 
0.066 0.248 
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Table 4-6 (Continued)    
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Occupation: Transportation 
and Material Moving 
occupations 
Indicator variable of occupation, which 
equals one if respondent’s occupation 
is Transportation and Material 
Moving occupations. 
0.050 0.218 
Industry: not working  Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent is not 
working.  
0.000 0.000 
Industry: Agriculture, 
Forestry, Fishing, or 
Hunting 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Agriculture or Forestry or Fishing or 
Hunting. 
0.008 0.088 
Industry: Mining Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Mining. 
0.004 0.063 
Industry: Construction Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Construction. 
0.050 0.218 
Industry: Manufacturing Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Manufacturing. 
0.131 0.337 
Industry: Wholesale Trade Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Wholesale Trade. 
0.031 0.173 
Industry: Retail Trade Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Retail Trade. 
0.098 0.297 
Industry: Transportation and 
Warehousing 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Transportation and Warehousing. 
0.040 0.197 
Industry: Utilities Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Utilities. 
0.011 0.106 
Industry: Information Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Information. 
0.029 0.168 
Industry: Finance and 
Insurance 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Finance and Insurance. 
0.061 0.239 
Industry: Real Estate and 
Rental and Leasing 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing. 
0.017 0.129 
Industry: Professional, 
Scientific, or Technical 
Services 
 
 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Professional or Scientific or 
Technical Services. 
0.063 0.242 
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Table 4-6 (Continued)    
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Industry: Management, 
Administrative and Waste 
Management Services 
 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Management or Administrative or 
Waste Management Services. 
0.032 0.175 
Industry: Educational 
Services 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Educational Services. 
0.117 0.322 
Industry: Health Care and 
Social Services  
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Health Care and Social Services. 
0.144 0.351 
Industry: Arts, Entertainment, 
and Recreation 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Arts or Entertainment or Recreation. 
0.015 0.121 
Industry: Accommodation 
and Food Services 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Accommodation and Food Services. 
0.046 0.209 
Industry: Other Services Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Other Services. 
0.041 0.199 
Industry: Public 
Administration 
Indicator variable of industry, which 
equals one if respondent’s industry is 
Public Administration. 
0.063 0.244 
 
 
4.3 Limitations of the Two Datasets 
The PSID and the ATUS datasets have several common limitations. First, both 
datasets don’t directly observe worker’s effort. Thus, this dissertation needs to use proxy 
for effort supply in the analysis. Second, the incentive pay in both datasets includes 
overtime pay as part of the incentives. But overtime pay could be highly associated with 
overtime working hours (i.e., labor supply) and sometimes the workers are forced to work 
overtime by the companies. In this case, the overtime pay is not an incentive. So this 
analysis uses selected years of PSID data to have separate measures of different types of 
incentives for several years in order to have more accurate measures of incentive pay. 
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Third, the variables of the number of (own) children only measure those under the age of 
18 living in the family unit or household. But the number of children above the age of 18 
might have impacts on the worker’s reactions to incentives. Both datasets don’t provide 
sufficient information for the analysis to measure the number of children above 18 in the 
household. Fourth, both datasets don’t observe an individual’s target income or loss 
aversion so that this dissertation couldn’t explore these two possible theoretical 
mechanisms in the analysis. 
In addition to these common limitations, the PSID data has too few female 
observations in the sample due to the nature of the PSID study’s respondents. Because 
there might be differences between men and women in terms of reacting to compensation 
incentives, there could be some biases to use this male-dominated sample. Another 
limitation of the PSID data is the industry and occupation categories are general and 
broad, which is not as detailed categories as in the ATUS. Different industries especially 
different occupations usually have different types of incentives so that it might influence 
workers’ choices based on incentives. Thus, it might be necessary to control more 
detailed categories of job industry and occupation in the analysis. 
Moreover, the ATUS dataset has several other limitations as well. First, as 
mentioned earlier in section 4.2.1, the incentive pay measure in the ATUS doesn’t 
include bonuses due to the ATUS’s original questionnaire. But bonuses are one of the 
most important compensation incentives the companies use, so there might be biases not 
having bonuses as part of the incentive pay measure. Second, due to the limited 
information, the child-related variables from the ATUS focus on the respondent’s own 
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child under the age of 18 living in the household, ignoring the own child not living in the 
household or other children living in the household. Actually, the other types of children 
might also influence the individual’s reactions to incentives. Moreover, the indicators of 
the presence of own children at various ages in the household can’t differentiate people 
who don’t have a child and people who have an own child at the age of 18 or above 
living in the household due to the ATUS’s original questions. But those two groups of 
people might react differently to incentives.   
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Chapter 5  The Effects of Family Characteristics on Job Choices 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis and results estimating the effects of 
family characteristics on workers’ job choices based on incentives in the job using both 
the PSID and the AUTS samples. First, this chapter describes the empirical method—
multivariate Probit regressions—used to examine the reduced-form relationships between 
family characteristics and the presence of incentive pay in the job in section 5.1. Second, 
section 5.2 presents and discusses the regression results using the data from the 1975-
2010 PSID sample. Third, section 5.3 first reports and discusses the regression results of 
the reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and the presence of 
incentive pay using data from the 2003-2012 ATUS full sample. Moreover, this section 
presents the empirical analysis adding time constraints on work from the ATUS full 
sample into the regressions to explore some underlying mechanisms by which the 
reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and worker’s job choices 
based on incentives occur. Furthermore, this section shows the regression results using 
the ATUS sub-samples by sex to explore the gender differences in workers’ job choices 
based on the presence of incentive pay in the job and the possible mechanism—time 
constraints on work—for women and men separately. Lastly, this chapter compares the 
estimation results using the same variables with both the 1975-2010 PSID sample and the 
2003-2012 ATUS sample in section 5.4.  
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5.1 Empirical Method 
The impact of family characteristics on a worker’s job choices based on 
incentives is estimated using multivariate Probit regression models.
21
 The baseline 
regression model is of the following form: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜀 
Where the dependent variable—the presence of incentive pay—is a binary variable (i.e., 
equaling “1” when the worker chooses a job with incentive pay; and equaling “0” when 
the worker chooses a job without incentive pay). “Family characteristics” refers to the 
family characteristics independent variables used in the estimation which include: 1) Two 
indicator variables of the spouse’s employment status: the worker having a working 
spouse and the worker having a not working spouse. The third indicator—the worker who 
is not having a spouse—is used as the reference group and not included in the 
regressions. 2) The number of children under the age of 18 using the PSID sample and 
the number of own child under the age of 18 using the ATUS sample. 3) Indicator 
variables of the presence of children at various ages living in the family unit/household. 
Using the PSID sample, three indicators are included: the presence of child aged between 
0 and 5, the presence of child aged between 6 and 11, and the presence of child aged 
between 12 and 17; The fourth indicator variable: the presence of child aged 18 and 
                                                 
21
  Note for the ATUS data, both the weighted Probit regressions and weighted OLS 
regressions are used in the empirical analysis for the binary dependent variable, which is 
the presence of incentive pay received in the job in these regressions. But the weighted 
Probit regressions had some issues in terms of convergence especially for analyzing the 
whole ATUS sample. The estimated coefficients are similar comparing the weighted 
Probit regressions and the weighted OLS regressions for partial sample. Thus, due to the 
computational convenience and accuracy, this dissertation reports the weighted OLS 
estimates using the ATUS sample.  
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above is used as the reference group and not included in the regressions. Using the ATUS 
sample, five indicators are included: the presence of own child aged under 1, the presence 
of own child aged between 1 and 2, the presence of own child aged between 3 and 5, the 
presence of own child aged between 6 and 12, and the presence of child aged between 13 
and 17. The sixth indicator: no own child under the age of 18 living in the household is 
used as the reference group and not included in the regressions. 4) Using the PSID 
sample, the indicator variable of the presence of alternative family income sources is 
included in the regressions as one of the family characteristics. The analysis also has year 
fixed effects when using the PSID sample.  
Adding control variables into the baseline regressions, the regressions models 
become as the following form: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
Where the control variables include indicator variable of gender, potential labor market 
experience and its square, completed education, indicator variable of union member 
status, race, occupation, industry, state and year for using both the PSID and ATUS 
samples. In addition, the indicator variable of living in a metropolitan area is controlled in 
the regressions using the ATUS sample.  
Furthermore, to test how one possible theoretical mechanism—time constraints on 
work—plays the role in the relationships between family characteristics and worker’s job 
choices based incentives, the analysis first adds the aggregate time constraints on work 
using the ATUS sample into the regression as:  
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛽3 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝜀 
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Where the Controls are the same control variables using the ATUS sample as 
aforementioned. Moreover, the analysis adds three separate time constraints on work 
variables—time spent on household activities, time spent on caring for other people, and 
time spent on socializing and sports —into the regression as: 
𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠
+ 𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
+ 𝛽5 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 
+ 𝛽6 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀 
 
5.2 Regression Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Job 
Choices using the PSID  
This section presents the regression results of the reduce-form relationships 
between family characteristics and workers’ decisions on sorting themselves into 
different jobs on the basis of incentives present in the job using the data from the 1975-
2010 PSID sample and discusses the implications of these results. The empirical 
estimates are presented in Table 5-1. The marginal effects of the Probit coefficients are 
reported in both columns. 
First, column (1) presents the results from a baseline model that only includes the 
family characteristics—the employment status of spouse, the number of children, the 
presence of child at different ages, and the presence of alternative family income 
sources—as the independent variables. As can be seen from column (1), the estimates 
demonstrate that family characteristics have significant relationships with the dependent 
variable—worker’s job choice based on the presence of incentives. Second, column (2) 
  71 
adds the control variables including gender, potential labor market experience and its 
square, education as the highest grade level completed, union member status, race, 
occupation, industry, and state into the baseline model. The analysis controls for year 
fixed effects in both regressions.  
The results in both columns of Table 5-1 consistently show that having a not-
working spouse and the number of children have significant relationships with the 
presence of incentive pay in the job. Specifically, a worker who has a not-working spouse 
is more likely (i.e., with a 15.6 percent higher probability) to have a job with incentives 
relative to the worker who does not have a spouse.
22
 One explanation could be that 
having a not-working spouse gives the worker more financial pressure so that the worker 
has a higher target income and also exhibits higher degree of loss aversion, especially 
relative to a worker who does not have a spouse. Thus, the worker would be more likely 
to choose jobs with incentive pay and then she or he could earn more income from 
incentives by putting more effort when she or he gets the job. Another possible 
explanation is that having a not-working spouse provides the worker more resources for 
work, such as time, related to the “wife/spouse as a resource” theory, so that the worker 
could work harder in the job. In this case, the worker is more willing to choose jobs with 
incentives so that she or he could earn more with the available resources for work.  
The results in both columns of Table 5-1 also show that the number of children 
has significant and negative relationship with choosing an incentive pay job. According 
                                                 
22   0.156 =
0.014
0.09
, where 0.014 is the coefficient of spouse employment status: not 
working in column (2) of Table 5-1 and 0.09 is the base rate of the respondents reporting 
the presence of incentive pay in the 1975-2010 PSID sample. 
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to the estimate in column (2), one additional child reduces the probability of choosing a 
job with incentive pay by 0.3 percentage points, holding all other independent variables 
constant. It implies that workers with more children are less likely to choose jobs with 
compensation incentives. One possible reason could be that having more children places 
more time and energy constraints on work so that the worker would exert less effort in 
the job. Thus, the workers having more children are less willing to choose jobs with 
incentives because they know they have less time and energy to put into work.  
In addition to these family characteristics, the results in columns (2) show that 
that there are significant gender differences in terms of workers sorting into different jobs 
based on the presence of incentive pay.
23
 Women are less likely (i.e., with a 7.8 percent 
lower probability) to choose jobs with incentive pay relative to men, controlling for other 
observables.
24
 Note that there is a small number of female observations in the PSID 
sample and women as household heads in the PSID sample are single or “the husband or 
boyfriend is incapacitated and unable to fulfill the functions of Head”.25 So the next 
section presents more evidence on gender differences using the ATUS sample and 
discusses possible explanations of the differences between men and women. Another 
significant result is that union member status has significant relationships with the 
                                                 
23
  This dissertation doesn’t estimate the PSID sample by sex to further investigate the 
gender differences in the analysis. The reason is that the sample of female heads is 
relatively small and the female heads are much less likely to be married in the PSID 
sample.  
24   0.078 =
0.007
0.09
, where 0.007 is the absolute value of the coefficient of spouse 
employment status: not working spouse in column (2) of Table 5-1 and 0.09 is the base 
rate of the respondents reporting the presence of incentive pay in the 1975-2010 PSID 
sample. 
25
  Source: https://psidonline.isr.umich.edu/Guide/FAQ.aspx?Type=ALL#130.  
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presence of incentive pay in the job: workers belonging to unions are less likely to be in 
jobs with incentives relative to non-union workers.  
 
Table 5-1: Worker’s Job Choice Based on the Presence of Incentive Pay and Family 
Characteristics—the PSID 1975-2010 Sample 
 Dependent Variable:  
The presence of incentive pay 
 (1) (2) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.014*** 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Spouse employment status: not working 0.013*** 0.014*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of children -0.006*** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
The presence of child age 0-5 0.014*** -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
The presence of child age 6-11 0.007** -0.000 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
The presence of child age 12-17 -0.003 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
The presence of alternative family income sources -0.000 0.007** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Female  -0.007* 
  (0.003) 
Potential labor market experience  -0.002*** 
  (0.000) 
Potential labor market experience-square  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
Education  0.001** 
  (0.000) 
Union member   -0.012*** 
  (0.003) 
Race dummies N Y 
Occupation dummies N Y 
Industry dummies N Y 
State dummies N Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Observations 125117 125114 
 
Notes: The marginal effects of the Probit coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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5.3 Regression Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Job 
Choices using the ATUS  
This section presents and discusses the regression results on the reduced-form 
relationships between family characteristics, time constraints on work, and worker’s job 
choices based on the presence of incentive pay in the job using the 1975-2010 ATUS full 
sample and using the ATUS sub-samples by sex separately.  
 
5.3.1 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Job Choices 
using the 1975-2010 ATUS Full Sample 
Using the data from the ATUS, this dissertation first does the similar analysis for 
the effects of family characteristics on worker’s job choices based on incentives as using 
the PSID sample and presents and discusses the regression results. The weighted OLS 
estimates of the relationships between family characteristics and the presence of incentive 
pay are reported in the columns (1) and (2) of Table 5-2.
26
 The baseline model is shown 
in column (1) with the independent variables only including the family characteristics as 
the employment status of spouse, the number of own children and the indicators of the 
own child at various ages living in the household. Column (2) adds other control 
variables including gender, potential labor market experience and its square, education as 
                                                 
26
  As explained earlier, in the analysis of using ATUS sample, the dependent variable is 
the binary variable of the presence of incentive pay received in the job. Both the weighted 
Probit regressions and OLS regressions are used in the analysis and the estimated 
coefficients are similar comparing the weighted Probit regressions and the weighted OLS 
regressions for partial sample. But this dissertation reports the weighted OLS estimates 
due to the computational convenience and accuracy for the ATUS full sample.  
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the years completed, union member status, whether living in the metropolitan area, race, 
occupation, industry, and state into the baseline regression. 
As can be seen from column (1), Table 5-2 demonstrates that some family 
characteristics, such as having an employed spouse and having own child at different 
ages present in the household, have significant relationships with workers’ job choices 
based on the presence of incentives. After adding control variables, the results in column 
(2) show that all the indicator variables for the presence of own child at different ages 
under 18 living in the household have significant and negative relationships with the 
presence of incentive pay in the job. This implies that workers who have own children 
under 18 living in the household are less likely to choose jobs with incentives compared 
to workers who do not have own children under 18 in the household. One possible 
explanation could be that having children under 18 demands more resources in terms of 
child care activities and education related activities, so that the workers have fewer 
resources put into work. Thus, the worker would be more likely to choose jobs without 
incentives since the worker knows that she or he doesn’t have sufficient time or energy.  
In addition, the results of column (2) in Table 5-2 also show that gender has 
significant relationships with the presence of incentive pay, just as in the PSID sample: 
women are less likely to choose jobs with incentive pay relative to men. Unlike using the 
PSID sample, union members tend to sort themselves into jobs with incentives in the 
ATUS sample.   
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Table 5-2: Worker’s Job Choice Based on the Presence of Incentive Pay, Time 
Constraints and Family Characteristics—the ATUS 2003-2012 Full Sample 
 
Dependent Variable: The presence of incentive 
pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse employment status: working  -0.012* 0.007  0.007 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Spouse employment status: not working  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Number of own children 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.008 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
The presence of own child age<1 -0.019 -0.028* -0.025* -0.023 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
The presence of own child age 1-2 -0.014 -0.024** -0.023* -0.021* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
The presence of own child age 3-5 -0.012 -0.020* -0.019* -0.019* 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
The presence of own child age 6-12 -0.021* -0.024** -0.024** -0.024** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
The presence of own child age 13-17 -0.030*** -0.029*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
Aggregate time constraints on work    -0.005***  
   (0.001)  
Time spent on household activities    -0.001 
    (0.002) 
Aggregate time spent on caring for people    -0.008** 
    (0.002) 
Aggregate time spent on social activities     -0.006*** 
    (0.001) 
Female  -0.045*** -0.044*** -0.045*** 
  (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Potential labor market experience  0.001 0.001 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential labor market experience-square  -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  0.002 0.002 0.002 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union member   0.074*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Metropolitan  0.008 0.008 0.008 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Race dummies N Y Y Y 
Occupation dummies N Y Y Y 
Industry dummies N Y Y Y 
State dummies N Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Constant 0.213*** -0.010 0.001 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
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Table 5-2 (Continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
R-squared 0.002 0.066 0.067 0.067 
Observations 54612 54612 54612 54612 
 
Notes: The weighted OLS estimates are reported; weighted standard errors in parentheses. *** 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
5.3.2 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Time Constraints 
on Work and Job Choices using the 2003-2012 ATUS Full Sample 
On the basis of examining the reduced-form relationships between family 
characteristics and worker’s job choices based on the presence of incentive pay, this 
dissertation explores one possible underlying mechanism—time constraints on work—
through which the relationships occur by using the detailed time information from the 
ATUS. The analysis adds the aggregate time constraints on work variable and three 
separate time constraints on work variables into the regression in column (2) of Table 5-
2. The results reported in the columns (3) and (4) of Table 5-2 are discussed in details in 
the rest of this section.  
 
5.3.2.1 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Aggregate 
Time Constraints on Work Variable, and Job Choices using the ATUS Full Sample 
Column (3) in Table 5-2 presents the estimates on the effects of family 
characteristics on the presence of incentive pay through the aggregate time spent on 
household, caring for household and non-household members, socializing, and sports 
activities. The results show that the aggregate time constraints on work significantly 
negatively associates with the presence of incentive pay. Specifically, one minute 
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increases in the daily aggregate time spent on these non-work activities reduces the 
probability of choosing a job with incentive pay by 0.5 percentage points, holding other 
independent variables constant.  
Moreover, the indicator variables of the presence of own child aged under one, 
between one and two, between six and twelve, and between thirteen and seventeen living 
in the household still have significant and negative relationships with the dependent 
variable after adding the aggregate amount of daily time constraints on work variable in 
the regression. This implies that the impact of child’s age related variables on a worker’s 
job choice is a separate effect, which may not be only through the aggregate time 
constraints on work. So the future research needs to explore other possible underlying 
mechanisms including a worker’s target income and loss aversion, through which the 
effects of the presence of own child at various ages on the presence of incentive pay 
might happen. This is also consistent with the prediction that having children under 18 
demands more resources so that the workers have less time to put on work. Therefore, the 
worker would choose jobs without incentives. It also implies that the effects of time 
constraints from having child under 18 are stronger than those of the financial needs from 
having children in the household. Otherwise, the coefficients of the presence of child at 
different ages wouldn’t be significant or even not be negative after adding the aggregate 
time constraints variable.  
Additionally, the results still show the coefficients of gender and union member 
status are significant after adding the time constraints on work into regression. 
Specifically, women are less likely to choose jobs with incentive pay relative to men, and 
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workers who are covered by unions are more likely to choose jobs with incentives 
relative to the workers who are not covered by unions.  
 
5.3.2.2 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Separate Time 
Constraints on Work Variables, and Job Choices using the ATUS Full Sample 
Furthermore, in order to explore how the theoretical linkage might work and 
differentiate the effects of different activities on workers’ job choices, the analysis adds 
three separate time constraints on work variables at the same time into the regression. 
The results in column (4) of Table 5-2 show that the daily amount of time spent on caring 
for household and non-household members activities and the daily time spent on both 
socializing and sports activities have significant and negative relationships with the 
presence of incentive pay in the job. Specifically, controlling for other variables, one 
minute increases in the daily time spent on caring for other people reduces the probability 
that the worker chooses a job offering incentives by 0.8 percentage points; and one 
minute increases in the daily time spent on both socializing and sports activities would 
decrease the chance of choosing a job with incentive pay by 0.6 percentage points. But 
the coefficient of time spent on household activities is not significant. These results imply 
that the activities of caring for household and non-household members and the activities 
of socializing, relaxing, leisure, sports, exercise, and recreation might have stronger time 
influences on work than the activities of household.  
Moreover, all indicators for the presence of own child at different ages under 18 
living in the household are still significantly and negatively associate with the presence of 
incentive pay in the job. This is consistent with the results in column (3), which implies 
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that the impact of the presence of own child at different ages on a worker’s job choice is a 
separate effect not only through time constraints on work variables. In addition, the 
results still show the coefficients of gender and union member status are significant after 
adding the time constraints on work into regression.  
 
5.3.3 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Job Choices 
using the ATUS Sub-Samples by Sex 
To further explore the gender differences in workers’ job choices based on 
incentives shown in column (2) of Table 5-2, the analysis next tests the effects of family 
characteristics on the presence of incentive pay for women and men separately using the 
ATUS sample. Columns (1) and (2) of Table 5-3 report the weighted OLS estimates of 
the relationships between family characteristics and workers’ job choices by sex. A chow 
test for all the coefficients across female and male sub-samples yields an F-statistic of 
5.943 (p-value <0.001), which rejects the null hypothesis of equality of all of the 
coefficients across the two sex sub-samples at a significance level of 5%.
27
 
As shown in column (1) of Table 5-3, female workers having own child aged 
under one, between one and two, between six and twelve, and between thirteen and 
seventeen are less likely to choose jobs with incentives relative to female workers not 
                                                 
27
  The sum of squared residuals from estimating the unweighted OLS model of full 
sample: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 "Gender") + 𝜀  is 7487.073, the sum of squared residuals from 
estimating the unweighted OLS model of female sub-sample is 3281.813, and the sum of 
squared residuals from estimating the unweighted OLS model of male sub-sample is 
4122.7643. Then the Chow test statistic is 𝐹 =
(7487.073−3281.813−4122.763) 102⁄
(3281.813+4122.763) (28922+25690−2∗102)⁄
=
5.943 with 102 and 54410 degrees of freedom.  
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having own child under the age of 18 present in the household. While for male workers, 
according to the estimates shown in column (2), only the presence of own child aged 
between thirteen and seventeen has significantly negative relationship with job choices 
bases on incentives. Thus, the empirical results show that there are differences in the 
effects of family characteristics on the presence of incentive pay by sex. But a t-test for 
testing the two coefficients of the presence of own child between ages of thirteen and 
seventeen across female and male sub-samples yields a t-statistic of 0.128 (p-
value>0.05), which fails to reject the null hypothesis of the equality of these two 
coefficients across the two sex sub-samples at a significance level of 5%.
28
 This indicates 
that the magnitudes of the coefficients of the presence of own child between ages of 
thirteen and seventeen are not statistically significantly different across two sub-samples, 
controlling for all other independent variables. And for both women and men, they are 
more likely to choose jobs with incentive pay if they belong to unions.  
                                                 
28
  The t statistic of testing the equality of the two coefficients of the presence of own 
child between ages of thirteen and seventeen across female and male sub-samples is 
𝑡 =
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
𝑆𝑏1−𝑏2
, where 𝑏1 − 𝑏2 = 0 . Assuming the two sub-samples by sex are 
independent, the standard error of the difference between the two coefficients is 𝑆𝑏1−𝑏2 =
√𝑆𝑏1
2 + 𝑆𝑏2
2 , where 𝑆𝑏1and 𝑆𝑏2are weighted standard errors of the two coefficients. Then 
the t-statistics are 𝑡 =
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
𝑆𝑏1−𝑏2
=
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
√𝑆𝑏1
2 +𝑆𝑏2
2
=
(−0.026)−(−0.028)−0
√0.0102+0.0122
= 0.128 
with 54410 degrees of freedom.  
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Table 5-3: Gender Differences in The Presence of Incentive Pay, Time Constraints, and Family Characteristics—the ATUS 
2003-2012 Sub-Samples by Sex 
 Dependent Variable: The presence of incentive pay 
 Women Men Women Men Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Spouse employment status: working  -0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.012 -0.001 0.011 
 (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) 
Spouse employment status: not working  -0.011 0.003 -0.010 0.003 -0.010 0.002 
 (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
Number of own children 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.007 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
The presence of own child age<1 -0.034* -0.024 -0.030* -0.022 -0.022 -0.023 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) 
The presence of own child age 1-2 -0.030** -0.020 -0.028** -0.019 -0.024* -0.020 
 (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
The presence of own child age 3-5 -0.021* -0.019 -0.021* -0.019 -0.019 -0.019 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
The presence of own child age 6-12 -0.030** -0.019 -0.030** -0.018 -0.029** -0.019 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013) 
The presence of own child age 13-17 -0.026** -0.028* -0.027** -0.029* -0.027** -0.028* 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Aggregate time constraints on work    -0.004** -0.006***   
   (0.001) (0.001)   
Time spent on household activities     -0.003 0.001 
     (0.002) (0.003) 
Aggregate time spent on caring for people     -0.010*** -0.004 
     (0.003) (0.004) 
Aggregate time spent on social activities      -0.003* -0.009*** 
     (0.002) (0.002) 
Potential labor market experience 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
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Table 5-3 (Continued) 
     Women          Men     Women      Men Women Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Potential labor market experience-square -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** -0.000 -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 0.003* 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Union member  0.030*** 0.103*** 0.030*** 0.104*** 0.029*** 0.103*** 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Metropolitan 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.010 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) 
Race dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
State dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant -0.048 -0.004 -0.038 0.009 -0.040 0.017 
 (0.067) (0.078) (0.066) (0.078) (0.066) (0.079) 
R-squared 0.055 0.067 0.056 0.068 0.056 0.069 
Observations 28922 25690 28922 25690 28922 25690 
 
Notes: The weighted OLS estimates are reported; weighted standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%. 
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5.3.4 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Time Constraints 
on Work, and Job Choices using the ATUS Sub-Samples by Sex 
In addition to examining gender differences in the direct relationships between 
family characteristics and workers’ job choices, the analysis also investigates the gender 
differences in the relationships between family characteristics, time constraints and the 
presence of incentive pay using the ATUS sample. In Table 5-3, columns (3) and (4) 
report the regression results of adding aggregate time constraints on work variable for 
men and women, separately; while columns (5) and (6) present the results of adding 
separate time constraints on work variables by sex.  
 
5.3.4.1 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Aggregate 
Time Constraints on Work Variable, and Job Choices using the ATUS Sub-Samples 
by Sex 
A chow test for all the coefficients of the relationships between family 
characteristics, aggregate time constraints on work, and the presence of incentive pay 
across female and male sub-samples yields an F-statistic of 5.857 (p-value <0.001), 
which rejects the null hypothesis of equality of all of the coefficients across the two sex 
sub-samples at a significance level of 5%.
29
 The weighted OLS estimates in columns (3) 
                                                 
29
  The sum of squared residuals from estimating the unweighted OLS model of full 
sample: 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 "Gender") + 𝛽3 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑛 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 + 𝜀  is 
7481.408, the sum of squared residuals from estimating the unweighted OLS model of 
female sub-sample is 3280.099, and the sum of squared residuals from estimating the 
unweighted OLS model of male sub-sample is 4119.266. Then the Chow test statistic is 
𝐹 =
(7481.408−3280.099−4119.266) 103⁄
(3280.099+4119.266) (28922+25690−2∗103)⁄
= 5.857  with 103 and 54406 degrees of 
freedom.  
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and (4) of Table 5-3 show that for both women and men, the daily aggregate time spent 
on household, caring for household and non-household members, socializing, and sports 
activities negatively influences their job choices based on the presence of incentive pay. 
Specifically, for women, one minute increases in the daily aggregate time spent on other 
non-work activities reduces the probability that the female worker chooses a job with 
incentives by 0.4 percentage points, controlling for other independent variables. For men, 
one minute increases in the daily aggregate time spent on other non-work activities 
reduces the probability that the male worker chooses a job offering incentives by 0.6 
percentage points, controlling for other independent variables. But a t-test for testing the 
two coefficients of aggregate time constraints on work across female and male sub-
samples yields a t-statistic of 1.414 (p-value>0.05), which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of the equality of these two coefficients across the two sex sub-samples at a 
significance level of 5%.
30
 This indicates that the magnitudes of the two coefficients of 
aggregate time constraints on work across female and male sub-samples are not 
statistically significantly different, controlling for other independent variables. 
At the same time, the estimates in column (3) of Table 5-3 show that for women, 
the presence of own child at all different ages under 18 living in the household all have 
significantly negative relationships with receiving the incentive pay in the job after 
adding the aggregate time constraints variable. While column (4) shows that for men, 
                                                 
30
  The t statistic of testing the equality of the two coefficients of aggregate time 
constraints on work across female and male sub-samples is 𝑡 =
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
𝑆𝑏1−𝑏2
=
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
√𝑆𝑏1
2 +𝑆𝑏2
2
=
(−0.004)−(−0.006)−0
√0.0012+0.0012
= 1.414 with 54406 degrees of freedom, assuming 
the two sub-samples by sex are independent.  
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only having own child between the ages of thirteen and seventeen in the household 
significantly affects the presence of incentive pay controlling for the time constraints and 
other variables. These results are consistent with previous results in Table 5-2 that the 
impact of the presence of own child at various ages on a worker’s job choice is a separate 
effect might not only through time constraints on work.  
 
5.3.4.2 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Separate Time 
Constraints on Work Variables, and Job Choices using the ATUS Sub-Samples by 
Sex 
 To further explore the different time influences of different activities on worker’ 
job choices based on incentives, the analysis adds three separate time constraints on work 
variables using the ATUS sub-samples by sex and presents the results in columns (5) and 
(6) of Table 5-3 for women and men. A chow test for all the coefficients of testing the 
relationships between family characteristics, three separate time constraints on work 
variables, and the presence of incentive pay across female and male sub-samples yields 
an F-statistic of 5.889 (p-value <0.001), which rejects the null hypothesis of equality of 
all of the coefficients across the two sex sub-samples at a significance level of 5%.
31
 
                                                 
31
  The unweighted OLS regression model is 𝑇ℎ𝑒 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦 = 𝛽0 +
𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 "Gender") +
𝛽4 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 + 𝛽5 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 +
𝛽6 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑛 𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠 + 𝜀. The sum of squared residuals from 
estimating the full sample is 7480.494, the sum of squared residuals from estimating the 
female sub-sample is 3279.629, and the sum of squared residuals from estimating the 
male sub-sample is 4116.801. Then the Chow test statistic is 
𝐹 =
(7480.494−3279.629−4116.801) 105⁄
(3279.629+4116.801) (28922+25690−2∗105)⁄
= 5.889  with 105 and 54402 degrees of 
freedom.  
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The estimates in column (5) show that both time spent on caring for other people 
and time spent on socializing and sports activities have significant and negative 
relationships with female workers’ decisions on choosing jobs based on the presence of 
incentive pay. Specifically, one minute increases in the daily aggregate time spent on 
caring for household and non-household member activities reduces the probability that 
the female worker chooses a job with incentives by 1.0 percentage points, controlling for 
other independent variables; and one minute increases in the daily aggregate time spent 
on socializing and sports reduces the probability that the female worker chooses a job 
with incentives by 0.3 percentage points, controlling for other independent variables. 
While column (6) shows that for male workers, only the time spent on socializing and 
sports significantly influences the presence of incentive pay in the job. One minute 
increases in the daily aggregate time spent on socializing and sports reduces the 
probability that the male worker chooses a job providing incentive pay by 0.9 percentage 
points, controlling for other independent variables. Moreover, a t-test for testing the two 
coefficients of aggregate time spent on social activities across female and male sub-
samples yields a t-statistic of 2.121 (p-value<0.05), which rejects the null hypothesis of 
the equality of these two coefficients across two sub-samples at a significance level of 
5%.
32
 This indicates that time spent on the activities of socializing and sports seems to 
have stronger effects on male workers’ job choices on the presence of incentive pay 
                                                 
32
  The t statistic of testing the equality of the two coefficients of aggregate time spent on 
social activities across female and male sub-samples is 𝑡 =
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
𝑆𝑏1−𝑏2
=
(𝛽1−𝛽2)−(𝑏1−𝑏2)
√𝑆𝑏1
2 +𝑆𝑏2
2
=
(−0.003)−(−0.009)−0
√0.0022+0.0022
= 2.121 with 54402 degrees of freedom, assuming 
the two sub-samples by sex are independent.   
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relative to female workers’ job choices, based on the magnitudes of the two coefficients 
of time spent on social activities. This is also consistent with the gender norms that men 
tend to spend more time on social activities than women.  
At the same time, the estimates in column (5) show that for women, the presence 
of own child aged between one and two, between six and twelve, and between thirteen 
and seventeen living in the household have significantly negative relationships with 
receiving the incentive pay in the job after adding the time constraints variables; While 
column (6) shows that for men, only having own child between the ages of thirteen and 
seventeen in the household significantly affects the presence of incentive pay controlling 
for the time constraints and other variables. This evidence supports that the impact of the 
presence of own child at various ages on a worker’s job choice is a separate effect not 
only through time constraints on work variables.  
 
5.4 Comparison of Regression Results on the Relationships between Family 
Characteristics and Job Choices using the PSID and the ATUS Samples 
The PSID sample and the ATUS sample have different compositions in terms of 
the presence of incentive pay in the job, family characteristics and other demographics. 
Therefore, it’s useful to compare the estimation results between these two samples. In 
order to fully compare the estimates on the effects of family characteristics on workers’ 
job choices based on incentives, the analysis uses the same family characteristics 
including the employment status of spouse and the number of children living in the 
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family during the same time period from 2003 to 2010.
33
 The analysis also controls for 
gender, potential labor market experience and its square, completed education, union 
member status, race, occupation, industry, state, and year for both samples. Table 5-4 
reports the marginal effects of Probit coefficients on comparison between the results of 
the reduced-form relationships between the presence of incentive pay and family 
characteristics using the PSID sample and the ATUS sample from 2003 to 2010.
34
  
According to the results, the number of children has significant and negative 
relationship with the presence of incentive pay only using the AUTS sample, but not 
using the PSID sample. It implies that the more children the worker has, the more likely 
she or he to choose jobs without incentives in the ATUS sample. But another set of 
family characteristics—the employment status of spouse—doesn’t show significantly 
relationships with workers’ job choices based on the presence of incentive pay in both the 
PSID sample and the ATUS sample.  
In terms of gender differences, only estimate from ATUS sample shows that 
women are less likely to choose jobs with incentive pay relative to men. The coefficient 
of female is not significant using the PSID sample. The union member status significantly 
positively associates with the presence of incentive pay in the ATUS sample, but doesn’t 
show significant effect in the PSID sample.   
 
                                                 
33
  To compare with the PSID sample, the analysis here uses “the number of children 
under the age of 18 who live in the household” to measure the number of children for the 
2003-2010 ATUS sample.  
34
  To fully compare with the PSID sample, the analysis here uses unweighted Probit 
regression for analyzing the 2003-2010 ATUS sample. The regression results using 
weighted OLS regression are presented in column (1) of Appendix Table 6.  
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Table 5-4: Comparison between the PSID and the ATUS (2003-2010): Worker’s Job 
Choices based On the Presence of Incentive Pay and Family Characteristics 
 Dependent Variable: The presence of incentive pay 
 PSID ATUS 
 (1) (2) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.009 -0.002 
 (0.009) (0.004) 
Spouse employment status: not working  0.019 -0.008 
 (0.012) (0.005) 
Number of own children -0.000 -0.010*** 
 (0.003) (0.002) 
Female 0.011 -0.045*** 
 (0.010) (0.004) 
Potential labor market experience -0.003** 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Potential labor market experience-square 0.000 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Union member  -0.003 0.060*** 
 (0.009) (0.005) 
Race dummies Y Y 
Occupation dummies Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y 
State dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Observations 8769 54900 
 
Notes: The marginal effects of Probit coefficients are reported; standard errors in parentheses. 
*** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%.  
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Chapter 6  The Effects of Family Characteristics on Effort Supply 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis and results estimating the effects of 
family characteristics on workers’ effort supply, which is measured as the amount of 
incentive pay workers received in their job, using both the PSID and the AUTS samples. 
First, the chapter describes the empirical method—multivariate OLS regression models—
to examine the reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and worker’s 
effort supply. Second, section 6.2 presents and discusses the regression results of the 
relationships between family characteristics and the aggregate amount of incentive pay 
using the data from the 1975-2010 PSID full sample. Moreover, the section also reports 
the effects of family characteristics on workers’ reactions to different types of 
compensation incentives including bonuses, commissions and tips using the 1992-2010 
PSID sub-samples. Third, section 6.3 first presents and discusses the regression results of 
the reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and the amount of 
incentive pay received in the job using data from the full 2003-2012 ATUS sample. 
Furthermore, this section shows the empirical analysis using the ATUS sub-samples by 
sex to explore the gender differences in workers’ effort supply. Lastly, this chapter 
compares the estimation results using the same variables with both the PSID and the 
ATUS samples in section 6.4.  
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6.1 Empirical Method 
The impact of family characteristics on the worker’s effort supply is estimated 
using the multivariate OLS regression models. The baseline regression model is of the 
following form: 
LOG(Amount of incentive pay) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝜀 
Where the dependent variable is the logarithm of real value of the amount of incentive 
pay the worker received in the job, which is the proxy of worker’s effort supply in the 
analysis. The family characteristics independent variables used in the estimation are the 
same as in the regression models in Section 5.1. Specifically, the family characteristics 
include: 1) Two indicator variables of the spouse’s employment status: the worker having 
a working spouse and the worker having a not working spouse; and the worker not 
having a spouse is used as the reference group and not included in the regressions. 2) The 
number of children under the age of 18 using the PSID sample and the number of own 
child under the age of 18 using the ATUS sample. 3) Indicator variables of the presence 
of children at various ages living in the FU/household. Different indicators are used for 
the PSID sample and the ATUS sample. 4) Using the PSID sample, the presence of 
alternative family income sources is included.  
Adding control variables into the baseline regressions, the regressions models 
have the following form: 
LOG(Amount of incentive pay) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 + 𝜀 
Where the control variables are the same as the regressions in Section 5.1. Specifically, 
the regressions control for gender, potential labor market experience and its square, 
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completed education, union member status, race, occupation, industry, state, and year for 
both the PSID and ATUS samples. In addition, the indicator variable of living in a 
metropolitan area is included using the ATUS sample.  
Furthermore, to test the effects of family characteristics on workers’ reactions to 
different compensation incentives using the 1992-2010 PSID sub-samples, the analysis 
uses four separate regression models with the dependent variables as the logarithm of real 
values of the amount of bonuses, commission, tips, and overtime pay received in the job. 
The formats of the regression models are as same as used for testing the effects on the log 
of aggregate amount of incentive pay. The same family characteristics and control 
variables are included in the regressions as used for the log of aggregate amount of 
incentive pay.  
 
6.2 Regression Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and 
Effort Supply using PSID  
This section first presents the regression results on the relationships between 
family characteristics and workers’ effort supply using the 1975-2010 PSID full sample 
and discusses the implications of these results. Then this section reports the estimates on 
the effects of family characteristics on workers’ responses to four different types of 
incentives using the 1992-2010 PSID sub-samples separately.  
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6.2.1 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Effort 
Supply using the 1975-2010 PSID full sample 
Using data from the 1975-2010 PSID full sample, the empirical estimates of the 
effects of family characteristics on the worker’s effort supply measured as the amount of 
incentive pay the worker received in the job are reported in Table 6-1. Only the 
individuals who reported non-zero amount of incentive pay such as bonuses, 
commissions, tips and overtime pay in the PSID sample are included in this part of 
analysis on testing the effects on workers’ effort supply. This is the reason why the 
sample size in Table 6-1 is smaller than that in Table 5-1 when analyzing workers’ job 
choices. The OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered at the individual level 
are reported in both columns. The analysis controls for year fixed effects in both 
regressions.  
First, column (1) presents the results from a baseline model that only includes the 
family characteristics—the employment status of spouse, the number of children, the 
presence of child at various ages, and the presence of alternative family income 
sources—as the independent variables. The results in column (1) demonstrate that some 
family characteristics such as the employment status of spouse significantly associate 
with the log aggregate amount of incentive pay the worker received in the job. 
Second, after adding control variables into the baseline regression, the results in 
column (2) show that only the indicator for having a not-working spouse has a 
significantly positive relationship with the amount of incentive pay the worker received 
in the job. It indicates that the worker who has a not-working spouse would put more 
effort (i.e., earn 25.8 percent more income from the incentive pay) than the worker 
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without a spouse, controlling for other independent variables. This is consistent with the 
result that a worker with a not-working spouse is more likely to choose jobs with 
incentive pay compared with the worker not having a spouse shown in Table 5-1. One 
possible reason could be that workers who have a not-working spouse usually have 
higher target incomes and stronger loss aversion, so that the workers would put more 
effort to earn more from incentive pay in order to meet the target income. Another reason 
could be that workers with a not-working spouse might have more resources for work due 
to the non-working spouse taking some responsibilities of household, so that the workers 
could work harder on the basis of these resources and earn more from incentive pay.  
In addition to these family characteristics, the results in columns (2) of Table 5-1 
show that that there are significant gender differences in terms of workers earning the 
amount of incentive pay in the job.
35
 On average, women receive lower incentive pay in 
their jobs relative to men, controlling for other independent variables. As previously 
mentioned, the female household heads in the PSID sample are special because they are 
single or their husbands or boyfriends are incapacitated and unable to fulfill the functions 
of Head. The empirical analysis exploring gender differences using the ATUS sample is 
described later in this chapter. Moreover, union member status has a significant and 
positive relationship with the amount of incentive pay in the job: union members earn 
larger amounts of incentive pay than non-union members among workers receiving non-
zero compensation incentives, on average.  
                                                 
35
  As explained in section 5.2, this dissertation doesn’t estimate the PSID sample by sex 
to further investigate the gender differences, because the sample of female heads is 
relatively small and the female heads are much less likely to be married.  
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Table 6-1: The Worker’s Effort Supply as Log of Amount of Incentive Pay and 
Family Characteristics—the PSID 1975-2010 Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Log of amount of 
incentive pay 
 (1) (2) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.759*** 0.066 
 (0.051) (0.055) 
Spouse employment status: not working 0.982*** 0.258*** 
 (0.072) (0.065) 
Number of children -0.034 -0.003 
 (0.026) (0.023) 
The presence of child age 0-5 -0.256*** 0.017 
 (0.058) (0.049) 
The presence of child age 6-11 0.014 0.084 
 (0.053) (0.047) 
The presence of child age 12-17 0.007 -0.020 
 (0.056) (0.050) 
The presence of alternative family income sources 0.124* 0.048 
 (0.050) (0.042) 
Female  -0.534*** 
  (0.065) 
Potential labor market experience  0.045*** 
  (0.007) 
Potential labor market experience-square  -0.001*** 
  (0.000) 
Education  0.135*** 
  (0.010) 
Union member   0.215*** 
  (0.052) 
Race dummies N Y 
Occupation dummies N Y 
Industry dummies N Y 
State dummies N Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Constant 6.499*** 4.296*** 
 (0.109) (0.672) 
R-squared 0.056 0.273 
Observations 11253 11253 
N_clust 5490 5490 
 
Notes: The OLS estimates are reported; robust standard errors clustered at individual level. *** 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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6.2.2 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Reactions to 
Different Types of Incentives using the 1992-2010 PSID Sub-Samples 
Furthermore, the analysis explores how workers with different family 
characteristics react to different types of incentives using the 1992-2010 PSID sub-
samples. Table 5-2 reports the regression results of the effects of family characteristics on 
the amount of bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime pay workers received in their job 
separately. The OLS estimation with robust standard errors clustered at the individual 
level are reported in all columns. 
In column (1), the results of workers’ reactions to bonuses show that only the 
indicator for the employment status of spouse: having a not-working spouse has 
significant and positive relationship with log of amount of bonuses, holding other 
independent variables constant. It implies that the worker who has a not-working spouse 
earns more bonuses compared with the worker without a spouse, among the workers who 
reported non-zero amount of bonuses received in their job in the previous calendar year.  
In column (2) and (3), the dependent variables are log of amount of commissions 
and log of amount of tips the worker received in the job. But the reported estimates in 
both columns don’t show any significant relationships between the family characteristics 
and workers’ reactions (i.e., effort supply) to commission or tips, after adding all the 
control variables in the regressions.  
The results reported in column (4) show that several indicators for having child at 
different ages under 18 living in the family unit have significant relationships with log of 
amount of overtime pay, controlling for other independent variables. Specifically, a 
worker who has a child between the ages of zero and five earns more overtime pay 
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compared to a worker who has a child at 18 or above; and a worker who has a child 
between the ages of twelve and seventeen earns more overtime pay relative to a worker 
who has a child at 18 or above. Moreover, the presence of alternative family income 
sources significantly correlates to the log of amount of overtime pay. It implies that the 
worker who has other income receiver in the family unit would earn more from the 
overtime pay than the worker who is the single income receiver in the family unit, 
holding other variables constant.  
In addition, there are significant gender differences in reactions to all four types of 
incentives for women and men. The results indicate that female workers, who are single 
or their husbands or boyfriends are unable to fulfill the function as household heads in the 
PSID sample, significantly earn lower income from incentives such as bonuses and 
commissions (i.e., work less hard) than male workers, controlling other things the same.  
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Table 6-2: Workers’ Reactions to Different Types of Incentives as Log of Amount of Bonuses, Commissions, Tips, and 
Overtime Pay and Family Characteristics—the PSID 1992-2010 Sub-Samples 
 Dependent Variable 
 LOG(Bonuses)  LOG(Commissions) LOG(Tips) LOG(Overtime pay) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.110 -0.190 -0.103 -0.084 
 (0.090) (0.400) (0.551) (0.138) 
Spouse employment status: not working 0.483*** 0.153 -0.736 -0.073 
 (0.124) (0.488) (0.725) (0.190) 
Number of children 0.015 0.273 -0.146 -0.103 
 (0.047) (0.213) (0.202) (0.059) 
The presence of child age 0-5 0.126 -0.544 -0.244 0.296* 
 (0.091) (0.486) (0.354) (0.142) 
The presence of child age 6-11 0.110 -0.119 0.627 -0.085 
 (0.086) (0.386) (0.538) (0.129) 
The presence of child age 12-17 -0.115 -0.236 0.020 0.341* 
 (0.089) (0.403) (0.481) (0.136) 
The presence of alternative family income sources 0.037 -0.491 0.133 0.239* 
 (0.074) (0.324) (0.464) (0.118) 
Female -0.451*** -1.173* -0.202 -0.421** 
 (0.102) (0.507) (0.510) (0.157) 
Potential labor market experience 0.035** 0.113* 0.021 0.034 
 (0.013) (0.057) (0.063) (0.020) 
Potential labor market experience-square -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) 
Education 0.181*** 0.048 0.101 0.048 
 (0.019) (0.071) (0.092) (0.027) 
Union member  0.092 -2.426*** 1.229* 0.119 
 (0.108) (0.691) (0.554) (0.123) 
Race dummies Y Y Y Y 
Occupation dummies Y Y Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y Y Y 
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Table 6-2 (Continued) 
 LOG(Bonuses)  LOG(Commissions) LOG(Tips) LOG(Overtime pay) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
State dummies Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Constant 2.208*** 7.514*** 5.393* 4.364*** 
 (0.628) (1.807) (2.223) (0.478) 
R-squared 0.398 0.473 0.469 0.197 
Observations 2794 270 237 1121 
N_clust 1826 220 186 915 
 
Notes: The OLS estimates are reported; robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at individual level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 10%. 
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6.3 Regression Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and 
Effort Supply using ATUS  
This section presents and discusses the regression results on the reduced-form 
relationships between family characteristics, time constraints on work, and worker’s 
effort supply measured as the aggregated amount of incentive pay received in the job 
using the 2003-2012 ATUS full sample and using the ATUS sub-samples by sex.  
 
6.3.1 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Effort 
Supply using the 2003-2012 ATUS Full Sample 
Using the data from the 2003-2012 ATUS full sample, this dissertation first does 
the similar analysis on the effects of family characteristics on worker’s effort supply 
measured as the amount of incentive pay including commissions, tips, and overtime pay 
received in the job as using the PSID sample. The weighted OLS estimates of the 
relationships between family characteristics and the aggregate amount of incentive pay 
are reported in the columns (1) and (2) of Table 6-3. The sample in Table 6-3 is not the 
same as that of columns (1) and (2) in Table 5-2. Only respondents who reported non-
zero amount of incentive pay are included in this part of the analysis on testing the effects 
on worker’s effort supply.  
The baseline model is shown in column (1) with only these family 
characteristics—the employment status of spouse, the number of own children and the 
indicators of the own child at various ages living in the household—as the independent 
variables. The estimates in column (1) demonstrate that some family characteristics, such 
as having a not-working spouse and having a child between the ages of thirteen and 
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seventeen living in the household, have significant relationships with the amount of 
incentive pay, which is the proxy for worker’s effort in this analysis.  
Column (2) adds other control variables to the baseline regression. As can be seen 
from column (2), few family characteristics, such as the indicators of having own 
children under age of one and between ages of thirteen and seventeen living in the 
household, show significant relationships with the amount of incentive pay the worker 
received in the job, after controlling other independent variables. It indicates that workers 
who have own child under one and between ages of thirteen and seventeen earn more 
from incentives compared with workers who do not have own children under 18 living in 
the household. One possible explanation could be that having very young children under 
one might demand more financial costs for child-care activities and having children aged 
between thirteen and seventeen demands more financial costs for education and related 
activities, so that the workers with children at these two stages have higher target 
incomes. And also these workers might have stronger loss aversion compared with 
workers who do not have children under 18. Thus, these workers who are having younger 
children under the age of one and between the ages of one and two would work harder to 
earn more from incentive pay to meet the target income when they have incentives in the 
job.  
In addition, the results of column (2) in Table 6-3 also show that gender has 
significant relationships with the amount of incentive pay as same as using the PSID 
sample: women receive less incentive pay in their jobs relative to men. As well, same as 
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using the PSID sample, union members receive more incentive pay in the jobs compared 
with workers not belonging to unions.   
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Table 6-3: Worker’s Effort Supply as Log of Amount of Incentive Pay, Time Constraints and Family Characteristics—the 
ATUS 2003-2012 Full Sample 
 Dependent Variable: Log of amount of incentive pay 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.058 -0.024 -0.025 -0.030 
 (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.055) 
Spouse employment status: not working  0.243** 0.070 0.067 0.060 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093) 
Number of own children -0.070 -0.040 -0.039 -0.040 
 (0.053) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) 
The presence of own child age<1 0.230 0.300* 0.302* 0.290* 
 (0.130) (0.136) (0.136) (0.136) 
The presence of own child age 1-2 0.090 0.131 0.133 0.123 
 (0.096) (0.099) (0.099) (0.100) 
The presence of own child age 3-5 0.094 0.039 0.041 0.035 
 (0.094) (0.091) (0.091) (0.092) 
The presence of own child age 6-12 0.095 -0.022 -0.021 -0.026 
 (0.087) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089) 
The presence of own child age 13-17 0.329*** 0.188* 0.187* 0.190* 
 (0.083) (0.088) (0.089) (0.088) 
Aggregate time constraints on work    -0.007  
   (0.010)  
Time spent on household activities    0.027 
    (0.019) 
Aggregate time spent on caring for people    -0.001 
    (0.027) 
Aggregate time spent on social activities     -0.023 
    (0.014) 
Female  -0.234*** -0.234*** -0.251*** 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.057) 
Potential labor market experience  0.024** 0.024** 0.023** 
  (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
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Table 6-3 (Continued) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Potential labor market experience-square  -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Education  0.025* 0.025* 0.023 
  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Union member   0.333*** 0.335*** 0.335*** 
  (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) 
Metropolitan  0.120* 0.121* 0.123* 
  (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Race dummies N Y Y Y 
Occupation dummies N Y Y Y 
Industry dummies N Y Y Y 
State dummies N Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
Constant 3.865*** 3.444*** 3.469*** 3.549*** 
 (0.059) (0.431) (0.431) (0.427) 
R-squared 0.019 0.134 0.134 0.136 
Observations 3524 3524 3524 3524 
 
Notes: The weighted OLS estimates are reported; weighted standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 10%. 
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6.3.2 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics, Time Constraints 
on Work, and Effort Supply using the 2003-2012 ATUS Full Sample 
As in section 5.3.2, on the basis of examining the direct relationships between 
family characteristics and worker’s effort supply, the analysis uses the detailed time 
information in the ATUS to explore one possible underlying mechanism—time 
constraints on work—through which the direct relationships could occur. The analysis 
adds the aggregate time constraints on work variable and the three separate time 
constraints on work variables into the regression in column (2) of Table 6-3 separately. 
The results are reported in the columns (3) and (4) in Table 6-3.  
Column (3) of Table 6-3 presents the estimates on the effects of family 
characteristics on the amount of incentive pay through the aggregate time spent on 
household, caring for household and non-household members, socializing, and sports 
activities. The results show that the aggregate time constraints on work doesn’t have a 
significant relationship with the amount of incentive pay, though the coefficient of the 
aggregate time constraints on work variable is negative and the coefficients of the 
presence of own child age under 1 and the presence of own child age between thirteen 
and seventeen are significant.  
Then as shown in column (4), the analysis adds three separate time constraints 
variables—time spent on household activities, aggregate time spent on caring for other 
people, and aggregate time spent on socializing and sports—at the same time in the 
regression to further explore how the theoretical linkage might work. But similar to the 
estimates in column (3), column (4) presents no significant relationships between these 
time constraints on work variables and the amount of incentive pay, though the 
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coefficients of the presence of own child age under 1 and the presence of own child age 
between thirteen and seventeen are significant.   
 
6.3.3 Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and Effort 
Supply using the ATUS Sub-Samples by Sex 
Column (2) of Table 6-3 shows that there are significant gender differences in the 
effects of family characteristics on workers’ effort supply. The analysis tests the reduced-
form relationships between family characteristics and the amount of incentive pay for 
women and men, separately using the ATUS sub-samples. Table 6-4 reports the weighted 
OLS estimates by sex from the ATUS to further explore the gender differences. A chow 
test for all the coefficients across female and male sub-samples yields an F-statistic of 
1.390 (p-value <0.01), which rejects the null hypothesis of equality of all of the 
coefficients across the two sex sub-samples at a significance level of 5%.
36
 
As shown in column (1) of Table 6-4, for women no family characteristics show 
significant relationships with log of amount of incentive pay. While for men, only the 
presence of own child age between thirteen and seventeen have significantly positive 
relationships with the amount of incentive pay, controlling for other independent 
variables. This implies that male workers who have own child between ages of thirteen 
                                                 
36
  The sum of squared residuals from estimating the unweighted OLS model of full 
sample: 𝐿𝑂𝐺(𝐴𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑝𝑎𝑦) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +
𝛽2 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 (𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 "Gender") + 𝜀  is 4140.272, the sum of squared residuals from 
estimating the unweighted OLS model of female sub-sample is 1654.184, and the sum of 
squared residuals from estimating the unweighted OLS model of male sub-sample is 
2316.570. Then the Chow test statistic is 𝐹 =
(4140.272−1654.184−2316.570) 102⁄
(1654.184+2316.570) (1499+2025−2∗102)⁄
=
1.390 with 102 and 3320 degrees of freedom.  
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and seventeen earn more from the incentive pay relative to male workers who do not 
have own child under the age of 18 living in the household. Thus, the empirical results on 
the effects of family characteristics on workers’ effort supply between women and men 
are different.  
 
Table 6-4: Gender Differences in Log of Amount of Incentive Pay and Family 
Characteristics—the ATUS 2003-2012 Sub-Samples by Sex 
 Dependent Variable: Log of amount of incentive pay 
 Women Men 
 (1) (2) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.029 -0.070 
 (0.076) (0.078) 
Spouse employment status: not working  0.059 0.063 
 (0.141) (0.120) 
Number of own children 0.052 -0.044 
 (0.092) (0.069) 
The presence of own child age<1 0.190 0.311 
 (0.202) (0.170) 
The presence of own child age 1-2 0.077 0.116 
 (0.176) (0.127) 
The presence of own child age 3-5 -0.178 0.097 
 (0.131) (0.115) 
The presence of own child age 6-12 -0.154 -0.027 
 (0.140) (0.120) 
The presence of own child age 13-17 0.017 0.241* 
 (0.125) (0.117) 
Potential labor market experience 0.031** 0.021* 
 (0.012) (0.011) 
Potential labor market experience-square -0.001* -0.001* 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.060** 0.010 
 (0.020) (0.015) 
Union member  0.136 0.387*** 
 (0.112) (0.072) 
Metropolitan 0.068 0.165 
 (0.079) (0.086) 
Race dummies Y Y 
Occupation dummies Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y 
State dummies Y Y 
Year dummies 
 
Y Y 
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Table 6-4 (Continued)   
Constant 2.291*** 3.848*** 
 (0.648) (0.605) 
R-squared 0.140 0.154 
Observations 1499 2025 
 
Notes: The weighted OLS estimates are reported; weighted standard errors in parentheses. *** 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
6.4 Comparison of Results on the Relationships between Family Characteristics and 
Effort Supply using the PSID and the ATUS Samples 
As in section 5.4, the analysis also compares the estimates on the effects of family 
characteristics on workers’ effort supply measured as the amount of incentive pay 
received in the job. In order to fully compare the estimates, the analysis uses the same 
family characteristics including the employment status of spouse and the number of 
children living in the family, and the same control variables for both samples during the 
same years from 2003 to 2010. Table 6-5 reports the OLS estimates for the comparison 
between the results of the reduced-form relationships between log amount of incentive 
pay and family characteristics using the PSID sample and the ATUS sample from 2003 to 
2010.
37
  
The results show that the indicator for having a not-working spouse has 
significant and positive relationship with log of amount of incentive pay only using the 
ATUS sample, but not using the PSID sample. It implies that a worker who has a not-
working spouse earns more from incentives compared with a worker without a spouse in 
the ATUS sample. But the results show no significant relationships between other family 
                                                 
37
  To fully compare with the PSID sample, the analysis here uses unweighted OLS 
regression for analyzing the 2003-2010 ATUS sample. The regression results using 
weighted OLS are presented in column (2) of Appendix Table 6. 
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characteristics and the amount of incentive pay. These are consistent with the reported 
estimates in terms of the amount of incentive pay in Table 5-1, 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4, in 
which most family characteristics don’t show significant relationships with the amount of 
incentive pay the worker received in the job using both samples.  
One possible reason of the weak results between family characteristics and 
worker’s effort supply is that this dissertation has not been able to disentangle offsetting 
positive and negative effects of these family characteristics, so that they are canceling 
each other out. For example, the number of children in the family could have opposite 
effects on the amount of incentive pay earned in the job. On the one side, workers with 
more children would have more financial pressure so that they will work harder and earn 
more from incentives in order to meet the higher target income. On the other side, more 
children demand more non-work time so the workers would work less hard due to the 
increased time constraints on work. In this case, the workers with more children receive 
less incentive pay. Therefore, the opposite effects with uncertain magnitudes could cancel 
each other so that the coefficients of the number of children are not significant in the 
analysis.  
An alternative explanation of the results could be that the measures of workers’ 
effort supply in the analysis are weak. This dissertation measures workers’ effort supply 
as the amount of incentive pay workers received in their job. The aggregate incentive pay 
includes overtime pay in both the PSID and the ATUS samples. However, in the 
literature, usually the amount of money workers received from working overtime is not 
treated as the component of incentives. A variable pay component often includes bonus, 
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commission, and tips. Also, the analysis doesn’t know the fraction of any workers’ pay 
package that is devoted to incentives. Some might have a big piece of incentive pay; 
while others might have a smaller one. Thus, in order to differentiate different types of 
incentives, this dissertation measures workers’ effort supply as the amount of each type 
of incentive pay separately using the 1992-2010 PSID sub-samples. The empirical results 
only show the significant effect of the spouse employment status on the amount of 
bonuses workers received. There are no significant relationships between family 
characteristics and the amount of commissions or tips. And the sample sizes of 
individuals reporting non-zero amount of commission and tips are very small. It would be 
better to have a larger sample to test the effects on these types of incentives. But this 
dissertation could not measure workers’ reactions to separate incentives in the ATUS 
sample because the survey does not ask workers to report separate types of incentive pay. 
Also, the incentive pay in the ATUS includes only commissions, tips, and overtime pay 
but not bonuses. Thus, the measure in this dissertation—the amount of incentive pay—
might not represent workers’ effort supply accurately. Future work needs to measure 
workers’ effort supply more precisely in a large sample.  
Additionally, based on the results in Table 6-5, gender differences are still 
significant for both samples. Female workers earned less incentive pay than men in their 
jobs. Potential labor market experience and completed education both significantly 
positively associate with the amount of incentive pay workers received in their job in 
both the PSID and ATUS samples; while union member status has significant and 
positive relationship with the amount of incentive pay only in the ATUS sample. 
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Table 6-5: Comparison between the PSID and the ATUS (2003-2010): Worker’s 
Effort Supply as Log of Amount of Incentive Pay and Family Characteristics 
 Dependent Variable: Log of amount of incentive pay 
 PSID ATUS 
 (1) (2) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.193 0.038 
 (0.167) (0.044) 
Spouse employment status: not working  0.230 0.141* 
 (0.221) (0.063) 
Number of own children 0.058 -0.013 
 (0.058) (0.019) 
Female -0.388* -0.232*** 
 (0.181) (0.047) 
Potential labor market experience 0.041* 0.021*** 
 (0.019) (0.006) 
Potential labor market experience-square -0.001 -0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.165*** 0.036*** 
 (0.031) (0.010) 
Union member  0.140 0.299*** 
 (0.167) (0.055) 
Race dummies Y Y 
Occupation dummies Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y 
State dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Constant 1.402 3.826*** 
 (1.067) (0.494) 
R-squared 0.372 0.125 
Observations 965 3558 
N_Clust 826  
 
Notes: The OLS estimates are reported; robust standard errors in parentheses clustered at 
individual level. *** significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
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Chapter 7  Conclusion 
To conclude, this dissertation investigates influences on workers’ reactions to 
compensation incentives. The investigation in this study focuses on the impact of family 
characteristics including the employment status of spouse, the number of child, the age of 
child, and the alternative family income sources on workers’ decisions on making job 
choices based on the presence of incentives and determining effort supply in the job. 
Both the theoretical and empirical analysis is conducted to examine the impacts of these 
characteristics.  
The theoretical analysis develops a model to present how the underlying 
mechanisms link family characteristics and workers’ effort supply on the basis of the 
standard effort maximization problem. Three potential theoretical mechanisms—target 
income, loss aversion, and time and energy constraints—are incorporated in this 
illustrative model. The model predicts that the employment status of spouse, child 
characteristics, and the alternative family income sources might have positive and 
negative effects on workers’ effort through those theoretical channels. Drawing from the 
extended model of effort supply and the theory of equalization differences, it also implies 
that workers associated with different family characteristics would sort themselves into 
different jobs based on the presence of incentive pay. Thus, this theoretical model 
illustrates some of the possible relationships between family characteristics and workers’ 
reactions to incentives.  
The reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and workers’ job 
choices based on incentives, and workers’ effort supply are examined empirically using 
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two large nationally representative data sets—the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) and the American Time Use Survey (ATUS). Using both the 1975-2010 PSID 
sample and the 2003-2012 ATUS sample, two analyses are conducted: first, the 
multivariate Probit analysis
38
 examines the impact of the employment status of spouse, 
the number of children, the age of child, and the alternative family income sources
39
 on 
the presence of incentive pay in the job as the measure of worker’s job choices based on 
incentives; second, the multivariate OLS analysis focuses on the impact of these family 
characteristics on the amount of incentive pay the worker received in the job which is the 
proxy of worker’s effort supply in the study. Moreover, using the 1992-2010 PSID sub-
samples, the Probit analysis tests how workers with different family characteristics react 
to different types of incentives including bonuses, commissions, tips, and overtime pay. 
Furthermore, the analysis explores one underlying mechanism—time constraints on 
work—through which the reduced-form relationships between family characteristics and 
workers’ reactions to incentives occur, using the ATUS sample.  
The empirical results from analyzing the PSID and ATUS data find that family 
characteristics, namely the employment status of spouse, the number of children, and the 
age of child, significantly associate with workers’ job choices on the basis of receiving 
incentive pay in the job. This supports the theoretical predictions that family 
characteristics have significant effects on workers’ sorting themselves into different jobs 
based on the presence of incentive pay. Moreover, the regression results are weakly 
                                                 
38
  The weight OLS analysis is reported using the ATUS sample in this dissertation.  
39
  The indicator of the alternative family income sources is not included using the ATUS 
sample. 
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supportive of the importance of family characteristics on workers’ effort supply. The 
results from both samples show few family characteristics such as the employment status 
of spouse have significant relationships with the amount of incentive pay workers 
received in their job. This dissertation also evaluates the effects on reactions to different 
types of incentives such as bonuses, commissions, and tips separately. The estimation 
results are different and not strong for each type of incentive. The weak results on the 
amount of incentive pay could due to the weakness of the measures discussed in the 
former section. The weak results also indicate that maybe the traditional effort supply 
model is correct and it’s not necessary to incorporate family characteristics into the effort 
supply function. Furthermore, this dissertation unveils the possible role of some 
underlying mechanisms using the detailed time information from the ATUS by adding 
time constraints on work to the regressions testing the relationships between family 
characteristics and workers’ reactions to incentives. Time constraints on work are 
measured as time spent on several activities including household, caring for other people, 
socializing and sports. The results demonstrate that time constraints on work significantly 
negatively relate to workers’ job choices based on the presence of incentive pay. It 
implies that the more time a worker spends on non-work activities, the less likely she or 
he chooses an incentive pay job. Moreover, some family characteristics such as the ages 
of children still have significant relationships with the presence of incentive pay after 
adding time constraints on work variables. This implies that the impact of the child’s age 
related variables on a worker’s job choice is a separate effect, which may not be only 
through time constraints on work. So the future research needs to explore other possible 
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mechanisms including a worker’s target income and loss aversion. Additionally, there are 
significant gender differences in terms of the impacts of family characteristics and 
reactions to incentives. The results using both datasets show that women are less likely to 
choose jobs with incentives and receive less incentive pay in the job relative to men. 
Moreover, the analysis also shows that there are significant gender differences between 
the presence of incentive pay, time constraints on work, and family characteristics. The 
results show that time spent on other non-work activities, especially the activities of 
socializing and sports, has stronger effects on male workers’ job choices based on the 
presence of incentive pay relative to female workers’ job choices.  
Furthermore, the empirical results in this dissertation have implications for labor 
supply research. As previously mentioned, one main reason of focusing on the role of 
family characteristics in determining workers’ reactions to incentives in this dissertation 
is that family characteristics matter to workers’ labor supply. According to the empirical 
results in the labor supply literature and in this dissertation, some family characteristics 
have significant relationships with both workers’ labor supply decisions and workers’ 
decisions on making job choices based on incentives and how much effort to put into 
work. For example, previous research shows that child-related variables, such as the 
presence of a child and the number of children, have significant effects on workers’ labor 
force participation and hours of work; while this dissertation also presents that the 
presence of children at various ages under 18 and the number of children significantly 
associate with workers’ job choices based on the presence of incentive pay in the job. 
Moreover, there are significant gender differences in the relationships between family 
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characteristics and workers’ labor supply and reactions to compensation incentives. This 
implies that the determinations of workers’ labor supply and job choices based on 
incentives and effort supply might be influenced by some common factors including 
family characteristics and gender. In addition, the empirical results in this dissertation 
show that some family characteristics such as the presence of young child (e.g., the 
presence of own child under one using the ATUS sample), which are used as typical 
exclusion restriction in the classical Heckman selection approach, have significant 
relationships with both workers’ job choices based on the presence of incentive pay and 
effort supply. It implies that some variables used as exclusion restriction in the Heckman 
selection model might have significant relationships with the dependent variable, such as 
the amount of earnings, in the second stage of the selection model. These results, 
therefore, suggest that some re-thinking of the validity of this exclusive restriction is 
warranted.  
So in conclusion, the contribution of this dissertation to the literature is adding a 
novel perspective to heterogeneous responses to compensation incentives by workers, by 
shedding light on the previously unexplored roles that family characteristics can play. 
Given the limited analyses on this topic, these results using both the PSID and the ATUS 
data sets in this dissertation are important, but future research efforts should use stronger 
measures of workers’ effort supply to better understand the relationships between family 
characteristics and workers’ reactions to incentives. This could include measuring the 
separate incentive pay in a larger sample or collecting income data from incentive 
components in an incentive-pay dominated occupation such as sales. Future studies 
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should also explicitly analyze the possible underlying mechanisms, such as a worker’s 
target income and the degree of a worker’s loss aversion. This could include a field study 
using an employee survey in an organization to collect data that includes subjective 
measures of workers’ target income and degree of loss aversion combined with archival 
data from human resources records. There is still much to be learned about the role of 
family characteristics in determining workers’ reactions to compensation incentives using 
a variety of data sources and methodologies.  
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 Appendix Tables 
Appendix Table 1: Consumer Price Index Data from 1975 to2012 
All Urban Consumers -- CPI-U 
Year Annual Average Annual Percent Change  
1975 53.8 9.10% 
1976 56.9 5.70% 
1977 60.6 6.50% 
1978 65.2 7.60% 
1979 72.6 11.30% 
1980 82.4 13.50% 
1981 90.9 10.30% 
1982 96.5 6.10% 
1983 99.6 3.20% 
1984 103.9 4.30% 
1985 107.6 3.50% 
1986 109.6 1.90% 
1987 113.6 3.70% 
1988 118.3 4.10% 
1989 124 4.80% 
1990 130.7 5.40% 
1991 136.2 4.20% 
1992 140.3 3.00% 
1993 144.5 3.00% 
1994 148.2 2.60% 
1995 152.4 2.80% 
1996 156.9 2.90% 
1997 160.5 2.30% 
1998 163 1.60% 
1999 166.6 2.20% 
2000 172.2 3.40% 
2001 177.1 2.80% 
2002 179.9 1.60% 
2003 184 2.30% 
2004 188.9 2.70% 
2005 195.3 3.40% 
2006 201.6 3.20% 
2007 207.3 2.90% 
2008 215.3 3.80% 
2009 214.5 -0.40% 
2010 218.1 1.60% 
2011 224.9 3.20% 
2012 229.6 2.10% 
Note: Base year is chained; 1982-1984=100.  
Source: https://www.minneapolisfed.org/community/teaching-aids/cpi-calculator-
information/consumer-price-index-and-inflation-rates-1913. 
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Appendix Table 2: Summary Statistics of Race, Occupation, and Industry for the 
1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero Income from Bonuses 
 (N=2,794) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
White 0.690 0.463 
Black 0.258 0.438 
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.010 0.101 
Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.010 0.101 
Latino 0.013 0.114 
Race other than black or white 0.001 0.033 
Other 0.015 0.120 
Two or more races mentioned 0.021 0.143 
Occupation: not working 0.018 0.133 
Occupation: Professional, technical or kindred workers 0.219 0.414 
Occupation: Managers and administrators (except farm) 0.224 0.417 
Occupation: Sales workers 0.060 0.238 
Occupation: Clerical and kindred workers 0.094 0.292 
Occupation: Craftsman and kindred workers 0.107 0.309 
Occupation: Operatives  0.130 0.336 
Occupation: Laborers (except farm) 0.045 0.208 
Occupation: Farmers and farm managers 0.018 0.134 
Occupation: Service workers 0.084 0.278 
Industry: not working 0.018 0.134 
Industry: Agriculture, forestry, or fisheries 0.030 0.171 
Industry: Mining 0.010 0.101 
Industry: Construction 0.076 0.265 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.213 0.409 
Industry: Transportation, communications, and other 
public utilities 
0.101 0.301 
Industry: Wholesale and retail trade 0.162 0.369 
Industry: Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.086 0.280 
Industry: Business and repair services 0.050 0.219 
Industry: Personal services 0.021 0.145 
Industry: Entertainment and recreation services 0.011 0.105 
Industry: Professional and related services 0.379 0.485 
Industry: Public administration 0.042 0.200 
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Appendix Table 3: Summary Statistics of Race, Occupation, and Industry for the 
1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero Income from Commissions 
 (N=270) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
White 0.796 0.403 
Black 0.181 0.386 
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.004 0.061 
Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.011 0.105 
Latino 0.000 0.000 
Race other than black or white 0.000 0.000 
Other 0.007 0.086 
Two or more races mentioned 0.011 0.105 
Occupation: not working 0.019 0.135 
Occupation: Professional, technical or kindred workers 0.074 0.262 
Occupation: Managers and administrators (except farm) 0.252 0.435 
Occupation: Sales workers 0.500 0.501 
Occupation: Clerical and kindred workers 0.033 0.180 
Occupation: Craftsman and kindred workers 0.059 0.237 
Occupation: Operatives  0.041 0.198 
Occupation: Laborers (except farm) 0.015 0.121 
Occupation: Farmers and farm managers 0.000 0.000 
Occupation: Service workers 0.007 0.086 
Industry: not working 0.019 0.135 
Industry: Agriculture, forestry, or fisheries 0.015 0.121 
Industry: Mining 0.000 0.000 
Industry: Construction 0.026 0.159 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.093 0.290 
Industry: Transportation, communications, and other 
public utilities 
0.085 0.280 
Industry: Wholesale and retail trade 0.344 0.476 
Industry: Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.259 0.439 
Industry: Business and repair services 0.067 0.250 
Industry: Personal services 0.015 0.121 
Industry: Entertainment and recreation services 0.022 0.148 
Industry: Professional and related services 0.274 0.447 
Industry: Public administration 0.000 0.000 
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Appendix Table 4: Summary Statistics of Race, Occupation, and Industry for the 
1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero Income from Tips 
 (N=237) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
White 0.624 0.485 
Black 0.333 0.472 
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.008 0.092 
Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.004 0.065 
Latino 0.013 0.112 
Race other than black or white 0.000 0.000 
Other 0.008 0.092 
Two or more races mentioned 0.008 0.092 
Occupation: not working 0.084 0.279 
Occupation: Professional, technical or kindred workers 0.042 0.201 
Occupation: Managers and administrators (except farm) 0.059 0.236 
Occupation: Sales workers 0.030 0.170 
Occupation: Clerical and kindred workers 0.046 0.211 
Occupation: Craftsman and kindred workers 0.059 0.236 
Occupation: Operatives  0.160 0.368 
Occupation: Laborers (except farm) 0.046 0.211 
Occupation: Farmers and farm managers 0.000 0.000 
Occupation: Service workers 0.473 0.500 
Industry: not working 0.084 0.279 
Industry: Agriculture, forestry, or fisheries 0.013 0.112 
Industry: Mining 0.000 0.000 
Industry: Construction 0.046 0.211 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.034 0.181 
Industry: Transportation, communications, and other 
public utilities 0.080 0.272 
Industry: Wholesale and retail trade 0.295 0.457 
Industry: Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.013 0.112 
Industry: Business and repair services 0.034 0.181 
Industry: Personal services 0.245 0.431 
Industry: Entertainment and recreation services 0.038 0.192 
Industry: Professional and related services 0.270 0.445 
Industry: Public administration 0.017 0.129 
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Appendix Table 5: Summary Statistics of Race, Occupation, and Industry for the 
1992-2010 PSID Sub-sample with Non-zero Income from Overtime Pay 
 (N=1,121) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
White 0.544 0.498 
Black 0.412 0.492 
American Indian or Alaska Native 0.005 0.073 
Asian or Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander 0.009 0.094 
Latino 0.012 0.107 
Race other than black or white 0.001 0.030 
Other 0.015 0.122 
Two or more races mentioned 0.017 0.129 
Occupation: not working 0.034 0.181 
Occupation: Professional, technical or kindred workers 0.140 0.347 
Occupation: Managers and administrators (except farm) 0.053 0.223 
Occupation: Sales workers 0.028 0.164 
Occupation: Clerical and kindred workers 0.161 0.368 
Occupation: Craftsman and kindred workers 0.173 0.378 
Occupation: Operatives  0.187 0.390 
Occupation: Laborers (except farm) 0.055 0.229 
Occupation: Farmers and farm managers 0.000 0.000 
Occupation: Service workers 0.169 0.375 
Industry: not working 0.034 0.181 
Industry: Agriculture, forestry, or fisheries 0.005 0.073 
Industry: Mining 0.008 0.089 
Industry: Construction 0.067 0.250 
Industry: Manufacturing 0.219 0.414 
Industry: Transportation, communications, and other 
public utilities 0.117 0.321 
Industry: Wholesale and retail trade 0.126 0.332 
Industry: Finance, insurance, and real estate 0.041 0.198 
Industry: Business and repair services 0.029 0.167 
Industry: Personal services 0.024 0.153 
Industry: Entertainment and recreation services 0.009 0.094 
Industry: Professional and related services 0.344 0.475 
Industry: Public administration 0.114 0.318 
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Appendix Table 6: Weighted OLS Results using ATUS (2003-2010): Worker’s Job 
Choices, Effort Supply and Family Characteristics 
 Dependent Variable 
 The presence of incentive 
pay 
Log of amount of 
incentive pay 
 (1) (2) 
Spouse employment status: working  0.006 -0.000 
 (0.005) (0.053) 
Spouse employment status: not working  -0.001 0.116 
 (0.007) (0.094) 
Number of own children -0.013*** -0.009 
 (0.002) (0.020) 
Female -0.045*** -0.226*** 
 (0.005) (0.049) 
Potential labor market experience 0.001 0.024** 
 (0.001) (0.009) 
Potential labor market experience-square -0.000*** -0.001** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Education 0.002 0.022 
 (0.001) (0.013) 
Union member  0.074*** 0.311*** 
 (0.007) (0.065) 
Race dummies Y Y 
Occupation dummies Y Y 
Industry dummies Y Y 
State dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Constant 0.001 3.700*** 
 (0.055) (0.449) 
R-squared 0.066 0.125 
Observations 54900 3558 
 
Notes: The weighted OLS estimates are reported; weighted standard errors in parentheses. *** 
significant at 1%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 10%. 
 
